esqappellate
President, MSI
- Feb 12, 2012
- 7,408
You mean the way Heller is "controlling authority" on whether or not individuals can be required to lock their firearms in such a way as to make them unavailable for immediate use when one is most vulnerable at home (Jackson)? Or how it is "controlling authority" as regards the ability to even acquire the "quintessential self-defense weapon" it calls out as being protected (NRA v BATFE, Pena v Lindley)? Or how it is "controlling authority" as regards "keep" of firearms that are "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes" (Friedman v Highland Park)? Or how it is "controlling authority" as regards mere possession in one's second home (Osterweil v Bartlett)? Or how it is "controlling authority" as to even whether the right is to be treated with the same respect as other protected rights (all of the above, and much more)?
It looks to me like Heller, which you clearly claim here is "controlling authority", is such for jack squat. Like I said (in a different, less specific way), the right that Heller is a so-called "controlling authority" for is disappearing in front of our very eyes as a result of the actions of the very same courts Heller is supposed to be "controlling authority" over. Some "authority".
So: your message here is merely a reply to my claims. It is not an answer to them.
Supreme Court decisions are supposed to be controlling authority over the lower courts. But the difference between theory and practice is that in theory, theory and practice are the same while in practice, they are different. Here, we see the massive difference between legal theory and legal practice. In practice, the lower courts can do whatever they want until the Supreme Court or some other entity gives them real incentive to do otherwise. And we know this because we see this very thing right before our eyes. One would have to be blind to not see that now.
In theory, a Supreme Court denial of cert means absolutely nothing. In practice, strings of cert denials on the same subject establish patterns that will of course have an effect on the behavior of the lower courts. Even certain Supreme Court members say much the same as that (the Jackson dissent). And the recent decision in Reed v Town of Gilbert should make that absolutely crystal clear, as that proves that the First Amendment is getting very different treatment (at a minimum, as regards grants of cert) than the Second Amendment is. In that context, why shouldn't lower courts treat the Second Amendment as a bastard stepchild of the Constitution whenever they wish to, if the Supreme Court can't even see its way clear to take even one case to "clarify" things? What incentive whatsoever have the lower courts to treat it other than how they wish?
Nor am I claiming it means that. Knowing what to expect of the game does not necessarily change the decision to play. It does mean we'd better start looking at contingencies, because winning the right in the courts in any meaningful way has now become a low-probability play.
Way too facile and way too cynical. Yes, there has been judicial resistance to the logic of Heller and McDonald. But that hardly means that those decisions are without consequence. A SCT decision is binding on all other cases when that SCT decision is on point. For example, no court has suggested since Heller that a state is free to ban handguns and no court has held since McDonald that the 2A does not apply to the States. Those two holdings are huge. By the way, Osterweil was a win! The Second Circuit certified the case to the NY court of appeals which held that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance meant that the NY statute should be construed to include second homes. That result would not have been possible without Heller and McDonald.
On your larger point, yes it will take more SCT decisions to end the judicial resistance to Heller and McDonald. It took a lot more SCT decisions to end the resistance to Brown and the Court is still addressing such resistance with respect to Roe. Nothing unusual about that in constitutional law.