United States v. Shaquille Robinson

[whistlersmother]

"Being armed is being dangerous" is not the same as "being armed and being dangerous"

I'm not a lawyer, so maybe this distinction is lost on me.

4CA is saying being armed is being dangerous - so you either get 2A or 4A protections, but not both.

I read it as 4CA saying "you want to carry, then you have no 4A protections." And I'm sure 4CA will eventually say the mere existence of 2A will preclude any 4A protections. Seems like a new tactic from the gun-grabbing 4CA judges - pit one protected right against another.

 

[kcbrown]

The justification for stopping someone only requires one valid reason. Any other reasoning is not relevant. In this case the traffic stop is the valid reason.

The stop isn't the problem. The search is. The question here is whether or not the search was valid. Per your own description of a Terry search, it was invalid because there was no reasonable justification for suspecting that Robinson (the passenger) was involved in criminal activity. While the stop itself obviously affects all who are in the car being stopped, the justification for the traffic stop is, in this case, the action of the driver (failure to wear a seatbelt). As such, the suspicion of "criminal activity" (which itself is quite the stretch as failure to wear a seatbelt is not a crime in many jurisdictions, but is rather an infraction, and regardless is absolutely no indicator of other criminal activity) is legitimate only with respect to the driver.

That is the problem here, and what you must address.

I fail to see how someone can riot in their car. I fail to see how this makes someone armed or even dangerous to the police officer. The Terry stop criteria tries to balance an immediate threat to police and others with the need to prevent arbitrary searches. While it is skewed toward protection it still provides protection against arbitrary searches.

Under the jurisprudence of this case, it provides no such protection, because now the need for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is no longer present, since now a report of lawful activity confers suspicion of criminal activity. Since in an area such as West Virginia where carry by all is lawful, every person might be armed, it follows under this case's jurisprudence that every person might be "dangerous" to the officer and, therefore, that a Terry search is justifiable against all persons. That utterly destroys the "protection" against arbitrary searches that you seem to think still exists under this case.

 

[Inigoes]

Another scenario would be observing someone walk down the street with a hammer, tool box containing screw drivers, and crowbar in plain sight.

A concerned citizen calls in a suspicious person carrying a hammer, crow bar and other burglary implements to the police. Also note the concerned citizen does not know the person carrying the tools.

Is this a carpenter on his way to/from work, or a criminal going to break into someone's home?

 

[GlocksAndPatriots]

Another scenario would be observing someone walk down the street with a hammer, tool box containing screw drivers, and crowbar in plain sight.

A concerned citizen calls in a suspicious person carrying a hammer, crow bar and other burglary implements to the police. Also note the concerned citizen does not know the person carrying the tools.

Is this a carpenter on his way to/from work, or a criminal going to break into someone's home?

In that scenario, I'd have no issue with a cop stopping the person and briefly asking what he's up to. It would be poor police work to NOT do that.

 

[Inigoes]

In that scenario, I'd have no issue with a cop stopping the person and briefly asking what he's up to. It would be poor police work to NOT do that.

Or you made a life long enemy, because the guy is your new neighbor on his way to catch a ride to work.

 

[jcutonilli]

"Being armed is being dangerous" is not the same as "being armed and being dangerous"

I'm not a lawyer, so maybe this distinction is lost on me.

4CA is saying being armed is being dangerous - so you either get 2A or 4A protections, but not both.

I read it as 4CA saying "you want to carry, then you have no 4A protections." And I'm sure 4CA will eventually say the mere existence of 2A will preclude any 4A protections. Seems like a new tactic from the gun-grabbing 4CA judges - pit one protected right against another.

The 4CA is being entirely consistent, guns are dangerous so our rights get curtailed. MD AWB upheld because guns are dangerous.

I believe there is more 4A protection than 2A protection from the 4CA. They can't simply stop and frisk you because you are carrying. There needs to be a lawful stop or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. There also needs to be reasonable suspicion of that the suspect is armed and dangerous. It is unclear whether the armed means dangerous is a generic finding or a specific finding to this case. I believe it is not unreasonable to conclude the suspect was armed and dangerous given the specific facts of the case. I don't believe that arms always means dangerous however. It really depends on circumstances.

 

[kcbrown]

The 4CA is being entirely consistent, guns are dangerous so our rights get curtailed. MD AWB upheld because guns are dangerous.

I believe there is more 4A protection than 2A protection from the 4CA. They can't simply stop and frisk you because you are carrying.

Right. But importantly, they can now frisk if you are stopped for any other reason.

There needs to be a lawful stop or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Or? Or is it and? The distinction is critically important.

If there is a lawful stop, are all passengers automatically suspect of "criminal activity"?

There also needs to be reasonable suspicion of that the suspect is armed and dangerous.

Not anymore. Not unless refusal to answer a question is itself grounds for such suspicion. How does the officer's "suspicion" here qualify as more than a "hunch"?

It is unclear whether the armed means dangerous is a generic finding or a specific finding to this case. I believe it is not unreasonable to conclude the suspect was armed and dangerous given the specific facts of the case.

What specific facts of this case lead to the reasonable suspicion that the passenger was both a participant in criminal activity and armed?

I don't believe that arms always means dangerous however. It really depends on circumstances.

Then what circumstances in this case distinguish it from those circumstances in which arms wouldn't translate to "dangerous" on the part of the bearer?

 

[jcutonilli]

The stop isn't the problem. The search is. The question here is whether or not the search was valid. Per your own description of a Terry search, it was invalid because there was no reasonable justification for suspecting that Robinson (the passenger) was involved in criminal activity. While the stop itself obviously affects all who are in the car being stopped, the justification for the traffic stop is, in this case, the action of the driver (failure to wear a seatbelt). As such, the suspicion of "criminal activity" (which itself is quite the stretch as failure to wear a seatbelt is not a crime in many jurisdictions, but is rather an infraction, and regardless is absolutely no indicator of other criminal activity) is legitimate only with respect to the driver.

That is the problem here, and what you must address.




Under the jurisprudence of this case, it provides no such protection, because now the need for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is no longer present, since now a report of lawful activity confers suspicion of criminal activity. Since in an area such as West Virginia where carry by all is lawful, every person might be armed, it follows under this case's jurisprudence that every person might be "dangerous" to the officer and, therefore, that a Terry search is justifiable against all persons. That utterly destroys the "protection" against arbitrary searches that you seem to think still exists under this case.

The stop is part of the problem because it forces a confrontation that would not exist. Did you read the wikipedia article on Terry stops that I previously cited? There appears to be at least ten SCOTUS cases that have addressed very similar issues. If you don't like my explanations then read the SCOTUS cases. They ultimately decide the issue. I would be very surprised if SCOTUS took this case given how many times they addressed this issue.

 

[kcbrown]

The stop is part of the problem because it forces a confrontation that would not exist.

But that doesn't matter with respect to development of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The fact that the stop forces the confrontation is the reason that the standard is "reasonable suspicion" and not "probable cause", no?

Did you read the wikipedia article on Terry stops that I previously cited? There appears to be at least ten SCOTUS cases that have addressed very similar issues. If you don't like my explanations then read the SCOTUS cases. They ultimately decide the issue. I would be very surprised if SCOTUS took this case given how many times they addressed this issue.

I'll have to look at those. Could make for interesting reading.

 

[lazarus]

In that scenario, I'd have no issue with a cop stopping the person and briefly asking what he's up to. It would be poor police work to NOT do that.

Sure. The person doesn't have to tell the cop and the cop has no reason to detain or search the person based on a report of a person carrying tools even if the person refuses to answer.

In most instances, depending on the state, the most a person is required to do by law is identify themselves to police.

 

[kcbrown]

The stop is part of the problem because it forces a confrontation that would not exist. Did you read the wikipedia article on Terry stops that I previously cited? There appears to be at least ten SCOTUS cases that have addressed very similar issues. If you don't like my explanations then read the SCOTUS cases. They ultimately decide the issue. I would be very surprised if SCOTUS took this case given how many times they addressed this issue.

Half of the cases seem to focus on the circumstances that warrant a stop/detention in the first place. Those are not relevant here, as this was a traffic stop and is thus ipso facto lawful.

The rest of the cases do not seem to address circumstances like the ones here. Specifically, none seem to address whether or not a traffic violation automatically raises reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to the point that it includes passengers. The cases that talk about passengers only seem to say that the stop itself is lawful under those circumstances and that a given stop's Constitutionality can be challenged by passengers just as well as by the driver. But see below.

Those cases that do seem relevant seem to speak with one voice: there must be a reasonable suspicion that the person (passenger or driver) be both armed and dangerous. To insist, as the court here does, that being armed means being dangerous, is to nullify Supreme Court language, to render the term "dangerous" as superfluous in the term "armed and dangerous". As I understand it, that is not permissible.

Knowles v Iowa does seem to, through implication, dispense with question of whether or not there must be reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the passengers to justify a Terry patdown:

Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

But even the above insists that it be upon reasonable suspicion that the person in question is armed and dangerous, not merely armed.

 

[TexDefender]

I can understand both sides concerns. But traffic stop are dangerous and many Law Enforcement officers are kill during such stops. In this instance, there was an anonymous telephone call. The caller stated that he/she had seen “a black male” with a firearm in the parking lot of one of the town’s two 7-Eleven stores. The caller reported that the man was a passenger in a car being driven by a white woman that had just left the parking lot. So it seems to me that the caller felt something was suspicious enough to warrant calling the police and giving a description that match the individuals.

A unit was dispatch and soon found the car matching the description given. The officer noticed that the driver was not wearing a seat belt and legally initiate a traffic stop. So if traffic stops are dangerous and this is further magnified by the Caller’s accurate description of the vehicle. Then further investigation is warranted. During the Officer initial contact with the Driver a second officer arrives. This officer made contact with the second passenger, separated the passenger from the driver. And asked whether passenger was carrying a weapon. Supposedly, without waiting for an answer, this officer “just started” to search petitioner, finding a gun “protruding” from petitioner’s pants pocket.

Well if the weapon was “protruding” from a pants pocket as the petitioner has stated then I don’t see anything illegal so far. Slipping a firearm in one’s pant pocket is not a normal place to safely holster a firearm. But many Law Enforcement departments have a policy of handcuffing individuals for everyone’s safety, when firearms could be involved. I don’t find the fact that the officer recognized passenger particularly disconcerting, because the when the individual’s identification was ran and positively connected him to being a convicted felon. Then the passenger was no longer being merely detained, but arrested and charged. Because a felon may not possess a weapon.

Per West Virginia State Police legal Division FAQs site (Formatting done by me for easier reading):
1. Individuals who possess a valid concealed carry permit may carry a concealed handgun in a motor vehicle for purpose of self-defense only.
2. West Virginia permits anyone who can lawfully possess a handgun to carry an unconcealed handgun.
a. If you choose to carry an unconcealed handgun in your vehicle and are stopped by a law-enforcement officer, you must understand that that the weapon will immediately attract the attention of the police officer.
b. The presence of the weapon may lead to action by the officer to ensure his or her safety such as the drawing of his or her weapon, ordering you from the vehicle, and/or performing a pat-down search.
3. Weapons intended for hunting must be unloaded and in a case when transported in a vehicle.
a. It is strongly recommended that, if you do not have a valid concealed carry permit, while traveling in a vehicle, that all firearms be unloaded and cased in a location in the vehicle that is not readily accessible to any of the occupants.
b. Any ammunition should be stored in a separate location from the firearm.

Remember that "reasonable suspicion" does not me it is a "Fact".

 

[GTOGUNNER]

Heien v. North Carolina Changed everything...

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-604_ec8f.pdf

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQzGpegDGks Audio of the SCOTUS

https://www.themarshallproject.org/...cops-to-pull-you-over-for-just-about-anything

 

[danb]

I fail to see how Heien v. North Carolina is related to this case. Let alone how it "changed everything".

 

[jcutonilli]

Half of the cases seem to focus on the circumstances that warrant a stop/detention in the first place. Those are not relevant here, as this was a traffic stop and is thus ipso facto lawful.

The rest of the cases do not seem to address circumstances like the ones here. Specifically, none seem to address whether or not a traffic violation automatically raises reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to the point that it includes passengers. The cases that talk about passengers only seem to say that the stop itself is lawful under those circumstances and that a given stop's Constitutionality can be challenged by passengers just as well as by the driver. But see below.

Those cases that do seem relevant seem to speak with one voice: there must be a reasonable suspicion that the person (passenger or driver) be both armed and dangerous. To insist, as the court here does, that being armed means being dangerous, is to nullify Supreme Court language, to render the term "dangerous" as superfluous in the term "armed and dangerous". As I understand it, that is not permissible.

Knowles v Iowa does seem to, through implication, dispense with question of whether or not there must be reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the passengers to justify a Terry patdown:



But even the above insists that it be upon reasonable suspicion that the person in question is armed and dangerous, not merely armed.

You may want to read it again. While Knowles summarized the issues, it was a drug case and did not have anything to do with armed and dangerous.

You may want to look at PA v Mimms "Under the standard enunciated in that case [Terry]—"whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate"—there is little question the officer was justified. The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of "reasonable caution" would likely have conducted the "pat down"." This appears to suggest that armed means dangerous. It also appears that if you are "large" you may run into issues.

Brendlin v CA "When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The question in this case is whether the same is true of a passenger. We hold that a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. (551 U.S. at 249)"

and AZ v Johnson. The police patted Johnson (passenger in a traffic stop) down because they believed that he was armed and dangerous, based on their observations and his statements. He was wearing a blue bandana (consistent with Crips membership), and that he had a police scanner in his pocket. While in the car, Johnson stated that he was from a town the officer knew to be associated with the Crips gang, and also admitted that had served a prison sentence for burglary and had been out for about a year. I can see how he may be considered dangerous, but I fail to see how he was armed.

Robinson seems very similar in my opinion and seems to be the type of situation where a "frisk" is not unreasonable.

 

[whistlersmother]

In all this discussion, I keep seeing the phrase "armed AND dangerous"

How is simply being "armed" considered "dangerous"? If it were so, there would be no need for all this "armed AND dangerous".

If "armed" is "dangerous", then the police are dangerous. If the police are not dangerous, then they must, by matter of unescapable logic, be disarmed. So says the 4CA.

 

[press1280]

This will be a very interesting term if this case and a public carry case get cert.
Sotomayor has been very strong on 4A cases but horrible on 2A cases. What will her opinion (or dissent) say when the question is posed about whether one must choose between 4A and 2A protections?

 

[kcbrown]

You may want to read it again. While Knowles summarized the issues, it was a drug case and did not have anything to do with armed and dangerous.

That is true as regards the direct holding, but the language I cited was a requirement for them to reach the holding they did since it shows what alternatives were available to the officers and, thus, the absence of a significant "officer safety" justification like Iowa was arguing. That makes it valid jurisprudence.

You may want to look at PA v Mimms "Under the standard enunciated in that case [Terry]—"whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate"—there is little question the officer was justified. The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer. In these circumstances, any man of "reasonable caution" would likely have conducted the "pat down"." This appears to suggest that armed means dangerous. It also appears that if you are "large" you may run into issues.

But PA v Mimms was a case under conditions where carrying a firearm was illegal, whereas Robinson is a case where doing so is legal. As such, in Mimms, the bulge in the pocket gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an armed criminal, i.e. armed and dangerous, whereas Robinson is a case where carrying a firearm is legal and, therefore, being armed does not automatically bootstrap into being dangerous.

Brendlin v CA "When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The question in this case is whether the same is true of a passenger. We hold that a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. (551 U.S. at 249)"

Yes. That isn't relevant here. That the passenger was part of the detainment proceedings is not in dispute.

and AZ v Johnson. The police patted Johnson (passenger in a traffic stop) down because they believed that he was armed and dangerous, based on their observations and his statements. He was wearing a blue bandana (consistent with Crips membership), and that he had a police scanner in his pocket. While in the car, Johnson stated that he was from a town the officer knew to be associated with the Crips gang, and also admitted that had served a prison sentence for burglary and had been out for about a year. I can see how he may be considered dangerous, but I fail to see how he was armed.

Yes, but the purpose of the Terry search is to ensure officer safety, with the justification being that someone who is both armed and dangerous presents a real risk to the life and limb of the officer. If you know or have good reason to believe that someone is dangerous, a search for a weapon during a stop is a reasonable thing to do.

But that isn't the case here. Here, there was no reason whatsoever to believe that Robinson was dangerous. A report of legal activity does not automatically bootstrap to "reasonable suspicion" that someone is dangerous. And without the dangerousness factor, the Terry search is unjustifiable. Otherwise, a Terry search is justifiable against all who are stopped in a region where carry of a firearm is lawful.

And that's the problem with this case. It bootstraps Terry searches into lawfulness merely due to the potential presence of a firearm and nothing else, because it equates the possession of a firearm by the detainee with dangerousness of the detainee. And that renders the "dangerous" language in "armed and dangerous" redundant, something that is not allowed as far as I know.

Robinson seems very similar in my opinion and seems to be the type of situation where a "frisk" is not unreasonable.

How can it be "reasonable" unless there is reasonable suspicion that the detainee is dangerous?

 

[jcutonilli]

That is true as regards the direct holding, but the language I cited was a requirement for them to reach the holding they did since it shows what alternatives were available to the officers and, thus, the absence of a significant "officer safety" justification like Iowa was arguing. That makes it valid jurisprudence.

But PA v Mimms was a case under conditions where carrying a firearm was illegal, whereas Robinson is a case where doing so is legal. As such, in Mimms, the bulge in the pocket gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an armed criminal, i.e. armed and dangerous, whereas Robinson is a case where carrying a firearm is legal and, therefore, being armed does not automatically bootstrap into being dangerous.

Yes. That isn't relevant here. That the passenger was part of the detainment proceedings is not in dispute.

Yes, but the purpose of the Terry search is to ensure officer safety, with the justification being that someone who is both armed and dangerous presents a real risk to the life and limb of the officer. If you know or have good reason to believe that someone is dangerous, a search for a weapon during a stop is a reasonable thing to do.

But that isn't the case here. Here, there was no reason whatsoever to believe that Robinson was dangerous. A report of legal activity does not automatically bootstrap to "reasonable suspicion" that someone is dangerous. And without the dangerousness factor, the Terry search is unjustifiable. Otherwise, a Terry search is justifiable against all who are stopped in a region where carry of a firearm is lawful.

And that's the problem with this case. It bootstraps Terry searches into lawfulness merely due to the potential presence of a firearm and nothing else, because it equates the possession of a firearm by the detainee with dangerousness of the detainee.


How can it be "reasonable" unless there is reasonable suspicion that the detainee is dangerous?

You seemed confused about criminality and passengers with respect to 4A. When you get searched you are seized (the other part of 4A) at the same time. Brendlin clarifies that the passenger is part of the seizure. Traffic stops are considered the criminal activity needed to seize someone. When the suspect is on foot you cannot make a traffic stop so some other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is needed. One part of the Terry stop criteria is for the search and the other part is for the seizure.

If Mimms had a permit, it would have been legal for him to have a concealed firearm. Additionally a bulge does not automatically indicate a gun, it may have simply been some other object in his pocket. The same logic you used for Mimms is the same logic I used for Robinson. I feel the suspicion of criminality (dangerous) comes from the store he left from, which is known to have criminals.

You claim the rationale for a search is armed AND dangerous, but in Johnson and in Mimms all you are really saying is the dangerous part is all that is needed. You have started to equate the two. The 4CA has simply made a stronger connection. You also seem to believe that criminality provides a demonstration of dangerousness. Why is the criminality of the stop not sufficient to demonstrate dangerousness?

 

[kcbrown]

You seemed confused about criminality and passengers with respect to 4A. When you get searched you are seized (the other part of 4A) at the same time. Brendlin clarifies that the passenger is part of the seizure. Traffic stops are considered the criminal activity needed to seize someone. When the suspect is on foot you cannot make a traffic stop so some other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is needed. One part of the Terry stop criteria is for the search and the other part is for the seizure.

The purpose of the search is to reduce the risk of death or bodily harm to the officer. The reason there is a standard for the search at all is because of the right to be free from "unreasonable" search and seizure.

The "criminality" of a traffic violation is sufficient to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement for the seizure. If it were all that were necessary for a search then there would be no "armed and dangerous" standard in the first place as regards traffic stops. But there is.

If Mimms had a permit, it would have been legal for him to have a concealed firearm.

That is true. I hadn't noticed that before. So much for that argument, then.

I do agree, that makes Mimms very troubling as regards Robinson.

Additionally a bulge does not automatically indicate a gun, it may have simply been some other object in his pocket. The same logic you used for Mimms is the same logic I used for Robinson. I feel the suspicion of criminality (dangerous) comes from the store he left from, which is known to have criminals.

So if you live in a dangerous neighborhood, then you're automatically subject to a Terry search in a region where carry of a firearm is lawful if you're pulled over?

You claim the rationale for a search is armed AND dangerous, but in Johnson and in Mimms all you are really saying is the dangerous part is all that is needed. You have started to equate the two.

Not quite. The justification for the search is the reasonable chance that the officer will come to grave harm if the person he's faced with is both armed and dangerous. If the person is dangerous, then the only remaining question is whether or not he's armed, and that is something that can be determined through a search. If the person is not dangerous, then whether or not he is armed is irrelevant. As such, the necessity of the search really hinges on whether or not the person is dangerous. The search is not justifiable if there is no good reason to suspect that the person is dangerous.

"Reasonable suspicion" comes into play because situations vary all over the map and the courts tend to err on the side of caution. Absent that, the standard would be "probable cause".

The 4CA has simply made a stronger connection. You also seem to believe that criminality provides a demonstration of dangerousness.

No, the 4th Circuit has eviscerated the 4th Amendment here, because now there is nothing at all that stands in the way of a Terry search during a traffic stop in an area where people may lawfully carry firearms, since the necessity for a reasonable suspicion that the person in question is "dangerous" is no longer required.

A report of a crime doesn't provide a demonstration of dangerousness, but it may, depending on the crime being reported, raise the reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, since while not all criminals are dangerous, all dangerous people (as regards law enforcement) are criminals.

But here in Robinson, absolutely no crime was reported whatsoever. No reported crime means no reasonable suspicion of dangerous criminality unless the reason for the stop is because of an observed dangerous crime or crime from which dangerousness can be inferred. A traffic infraction is not such a crime, because the vast majority of people who are pulled over for traffic infractions are not dangerous people. Some kind of causal link, even if only statistical, is necessary for such an inference and that simply doesn't exist here.

Why is the criminality of the stop not sufficient to demonstrate dangerousness?

Because not all crimes are equal with respect to dangerousness. To argue otherwise is to argue that all who violate traffic laws are "dangerous" for the purpose of a Terry search. And that is nearly everybody in the adult population, for some 41 million people a year get speeding tickets alone (http://www.statisticbrain.com/driving-citation-statistics/), which sets a very high floor on the number who get pulled over for traffic violations (as not all stops result in tickets, and not all stops are for speeding). But it must be remembered that the entire point of the search is to reduce the risk of grave bodily injury to the officer, so that risk is raised only (or, at least, primarily) by people who engage in criminal activity which goes well beyond mere traffic violations.

If all crimes raised equal levels of suspicion of dangerousness on the part of the person engaging in them, then all traffic stops would be made by SWAT teams. There has to be some level of seriousness of the suspected crime below which "reasonable suspicion" of dangerousness is no longer present. Otherwise, the 4th Amendment gives no protection whatsoever against a Terry search conducted by law enforcement under any circumstance where any violation of any law, no matter how innocuous, may have occurred. And yet, that is precisely what Robinson is ultimately saying.