Maryland HQL= Illegal Tax?

[gmkoh]

As had been alluded to before, during the AELR hearing, the MSP was directly asked how they came up with $50 and the reply from the MSP honcho was that the law allowed them to charge up to $50. After trying to obfuscate the real question, He finally admitted that they did not do a cost analysis, but as noted above, claimed the cost to print each physical card was $20. Shannon Alford was ready, flashed her NRA ID card which has imbedded RFID chip that allows her access to the NRA building and facilities ( I don't think the HQL will include an RFID chip) and said it cost the NRA $4.80 per card. (I think that was the cost- it was in the $5 or less range).

 

[Zaicran]

You guys are missing the bigger picture here. HQL itself is not constitutional (IMHO)...and yet you're going to argue over what the cost should be?

 

[Ab_Normal]

No. Please don't derail this discussion.

Rights are intrinsic. You get them, because. There is no other explanation required. They are not granted by the constitution, they are guaranteed by the constitution.

Maryland is a *very* religious state to this day. It wasn't until 1960 that atheists could hold public office. It's a bit early for the Christian Persecution Machine to come out. Turkey Day hasn't even happened yet.

Yeah! Let's wait for the x-mas happy holidays season.

 

[gmkoh]

You guys are missing the bigger picture here. HQL itself is not constitutional (IMHO)...and yet you're going to argue over what the cost should be?

I agree- but unless I am mistaken, and I might be, the courts do not and have affirmed that it is constitutional to require certain permits and such, such as the requirement to get a permit to assemble to exercise free speech, and that the state can assess a reasonable fee to cover- and only cover, the cost of such administration.. Nor do I think for example that the court has struck down the concept of a voter ID card per se, just provisions of enacting it. So attacking the cost is one way to assert the unconstitutionality of the HQL.
I think???

 

[Zaicran]

I agree- but unless I am mistaken, and I might be, the courts do not and have affirmed that it is constitutional to require certain permits and such, such as the requirement to get a permit to assemble to exercise free speech, and that the state can assess a reasonable fee to cover- and only cover, the cost of such administration.. Nor do I think for example that the court has struck down the concept of a voter ID card per se, just provisions of enacting it. So attacking the cost is one way to assert the unconstitutionality of the HQL.
I think???

A permit to own a handgun in your own home?

 

[Benanov]

A permit to own a handgun in your own home?

HQL is less restrictive than an ownership permit, but not by much.

Carroll County Commissioner Richard Rothschild once spoke at a meeting organized on these boards. He stated that showing up and rallying for our rights is begging the government to change its policies. He found the courts to be a better option.

So the cost isn't a complaint - it's an avenue of attack. Patrick from MSI stated it at the hearing to approve the emergency COMAR regulations. I paraphrase: be very careful here about charging to regulate a right - it gets expensive for the government when it loses, and it will lose.

 

[PJDiesel]

A permit to own a handgun in your own home?

Yes.

In your home, at the range, transported in the car......

An HQL is required to purchase a handgun in the state of MD as of 10/1.

 

[oldman12]

what happens if I want to go and shoot my handguns and my ak's the where purchased before 10/1

 

[PJDiesel]

what happens if I want to go and shoot my handguns and my ak's the where purchased before 10/1

Re-read my last post. It is require to purchase a handgun,..not own.

 

[oldman12]

Re-read my last post. It is require to purchase a handgun,..not own.

Thanks That's what I thought , but who knows living here in Maolley land

 

[UNcommon Arms]

I just read an old briefing from a case an associate of mine was a plaintiff in a few years back.

It revolved around a local municipality imposing a high(er) than necessary fee for rental inspections. Essentially they kept raising the rates (per unit) to do the yearly inspections. Landlords wanted the ability to use independent contractors to do the inspections, presumably at a lower fee than the fee the borough was charging.

Gist of the outcome was this:

"A license fee that is disproportional to the expense of administering a license becomes tax revenue and is no longer a valid license fee," Sanchez said. "Clearly, the borough's rental housing program renders this program an invalid taxing scheme."

Now, read this part:

Chester County Judge Juan R. Sanchez said anything above the fee's 1996 levels was an illegal tax because, he found, the borough did not need that much money to carry out the program.

Sounds a whole lot like the current Maryland HQL scheme, huh?

Discuss.

Murdoch v. Pennsylvania 1943 SCOTUS makes licensing a constitutional right - unconstitutional

U.S. Supreme Court ,

319 U.S. 105 (1943)

MURDOCK
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
and seven other cases, including
JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

Nos. 480-487.
Argued March 10, 11, 1943.
Decided May 3, 1943.

 

[UNcommon Arms]

Any other information on this would be appreciated. The case I was originally researching was from West Chester, PA if anyone was wondering.

They seemed to have had an overstepping local government on MANY different fronts. Granted it took some time and money to challenge them, but was worth it to those being affected. I feel there could be room for similar litigation here in Maryland.

Murdoch v. Pennsylvania 1943 SCOTUS makes licensing a constitutional right - unconstitutional

U.S. Supreme Court ,

319 U.S. 105 (1943)

MURDOCK
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
and seven other cases, including
JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

Nos. 480-487.
Argued March 10, 11, 1943.
Decided May 3, 1943.

 

[UNcommon Arms]

The SCOTUS has ruled previously that you cannot make laws that converts a right into a privilege and charge a fee.

Lest we forget, the constitution grants nothing. It's a document that sets the conditions by which we the people grant our consent to be governed....which is why elected officials must swear under oath to abide by these restrictions...

Additionally, most citizens forget that we are a Constitutional Republic, in that the rights of the individual are protected and predate the Constitution. The majority pretend we are a Democracy, where an individual is forced to comply with the will of the majority and that is what most politicians want and hope they believe so they just roll over and take it and accept it. Don't get me wrong, they'll piss and moan over bad government, then go back to watching Honey BooBoo and the Kardashians and not even bother to vote or participate in politics that shape our nation.

U.S. Supreme Court

319 U.S. 105 (1943)

MURDOCK
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
and seven other cases, including
JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

Nos. 480-487.
Argued March 10, 11, 1943.
Decided May 3, 1943.


[319 U.S. 105, 106] Mr. Hayden C. Covington, of Brooklyn, N.Y., for petitioners.

Mr. Fred B. Trescher, of Greensburg, Pa., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The City of Jeannette, Pennsylvania, has an ordinance, some forty years old, which provides in part:


'That all persons canvassing for or soliciting within said Borough, orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind, or persons delivering such articles under orders so obtained or solicited, shall be required to procure from the Burgess a license to transact said business and shall pay to the Treasurer of said Borough therefore the following sums according to the time for which said license shall be granted.

'For one day $1.50, for one week seven dollars ($7.00), for two weeks twelve dollars ($12.00), for three weeks twenty dollars ($20.00), provided that the provisions of this ordinance shall not apply to persons selling by sample to manufacturers or licensed merchants or dealers doing business in said Borough of Jeannette.'

Petitioners are 'Jehovah's Witnesses'. They went about from door to door in the City of Jeannette distributing literature and soliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the [319 U.S. 105, 107] Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society.[1] The 'price' of the books was twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each.[2] In connection with these activities petitioners used a phonograph[3] on which they played a record expounding certain of their views on religion. None of them obtained a license under the ordinance. Before they were arrested each had made 'sales' of books. There was evidence that it was their practice in making these solicitations to request a 'contribution' of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets but to accept lesser sums or even to donate the volumes in case an interested person was without funds. In the present case some donations of pamphlets were made when books were purchased. Petitioners were convicted and fined for violation of the ordinance. Their judgments of conviction were sustained by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 149 Pa.Super. 175, 27 A.2d 666, against their contention that the ordinance deprived them of the freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. Petitions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania were denied. The cases are here on petitions for writs of certiorari which we granted along with the petitions for rehearing of Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 1231, 141 A.L.R. 514, and its companion cases. [319 U.S. 105, 108] The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....' It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet the license tax imposed by this ordinance is in substance just that.

Petitioners spread their interpretations of the Bible and their religious beliefs largely through the hand distribution of literature by full or part time workers.[4] They claim to follow the example of Paul, teaching 'publickly, and from house to house.' Acts 20:20. They take literally the mandate of the Scriptures, 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.' Mark 16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God.

The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism – as old as the history of printing presses.[5] It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years.[6] This form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by various religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands [319 U.S. 105, 109] upon thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win adherents to their faith.[7] It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.

The integrity of this conduct or behavior as a religious practice has not been challenged. Nor do we have presented any question as to the sincerity of petitioners in their religious beliefs and practices, however misguided they may be thought to be Moreover, we do not intimate or suggest in respecting their sincerity that any conduct can be made a religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amendment. Reynolds v. [319 U.S. 105, 110] United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 167 S., and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, denied any such claim to the practice of polygamy and bigamy. Other claims may well arise which deserve the same fate. We only hold that spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types. The manner in which it is practiced at times gives rise to special problems with which the police power of the states is competent to deal. See for example Cox v. New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766. But that merely illustrates that the rights with which we are dealing are not absolutes. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 161 S., 60 S.Ct. 146, 150. We are concerned, however, in these cases merely with one narrow issue. There is presented for decision no question whatsoever concerning punishment for any alleged unlawful acts during the solicitation. Nor is there involved here any question as to the validity of a registration system for colporteurs and other solicitors. The cases present a single issue – the constitutionality of an ordinance which as construed and applied requires religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit of their activities.

The alleged justification for the exaction of this license tax is the fact that the religious literature is distributed with a solicitation of funds. Thus it was stated in Jones v. Opelika, supra, 316 U.S. at page 597, 62 S.Ct. at page 1239, 141 A.L.R. 514, that when a religious sect uses 'ordinary commercial methods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds', it is proper for the state to charge 'reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing'. Situations will arise where it will be difficult to determine whether a particular activity is religious or purely commercial. The distinction at times is vital. As we stated only the other day in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 672, 87 L. Ed. --, 'The state can prohibit the use of the street for [319 U.S. 105, 111] the distribution of purely commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have 'a civil appeal, or a moral platitude' appended. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55, 62 S.Ct. 920, 922. They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.' But the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of the collection plate in church would make the church service a commercial project. The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books. The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills. It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distribut ed free of charge. It is plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going concern. But an itinerant evangelist however misguided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way. As we have said, the problem of drawing the line between a purely commercial activity and a religious one will at times be difficult. On this record it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in a commercial rather than a religious venture. It is a distortion of the facts of record to describe their activities as the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. And the Pennsylvania court did not rest the judgments of conviction on that basis, though it did find [319 U.S. 105, 112] that petitioners 'sold' the literature. The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Mead, 230 Iowa 1217, 300 N.W. 523, 524, described the selling activities of members of this same sect as 'merely incidental and collateral' to their 'main object which was to preach and publicize the doctrines of their order.' And see State v. Meredith, 197 S.C. 351, 15 S.E. 2d 678; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 385-386, 46 N.E.2d 329. That accurately summarizes the present record.

We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44, 45 S., 54 S.Ct. 599, 601, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reformation.

It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant [319 U.S. 105, 113] if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax – a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce (McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56-58, 60 S.Ct. 388, 397, 398, 128 A.L.R. 876), although it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from, that commerce, so long as those taxes are not discriminatory. Id., 309 U.S. at page 47, 60 S.Ct. at page 392, 128 A.L.R. 876 and cases cited. A license tax applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment would have the same destructive effect. It is true that the First Amendment, like the commerce clause, draws no distinction between license taxes, fixed sum taxes, and other kinds of taxes. But that is no reason why we should shut our eyes to the nature of the tax and its destructive influence. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666; Schneider v. State, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306, 60 S.Ct. 900, 904, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667, 87 L.Ed. --; Jamison v. Texas, supra. It was for that reason that the dissenting opinions in Jones v. Opelika, supra, stressed the nature of this type of tax. 316 U.S. at pages 607-609, 620, 623, 62 S.Ct. at pages 1243, 1244, 1250, 1251, 141 A.L.R. 514. In that case, as in the present ones, we have something very different from a registration system under which those going from house to house are required to give their names, addresses and other marks of identification to the authorities. In all of these cases the issuance of the permit or license is dependent on the payment of a license tax. And the license tax is fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues. It is not a nominal fee [319 U.S. 105, 114] imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question.[8] It is in no way apportioned. It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax. As stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case involving this same sect and an ordinance similar to the present one, a person cannot be compelled 'to purchase, through a license fee or a license tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution.'[9] Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill. 511, 519, 41 N.E.2d 515, 519. So it may not be said that proof is lacking that these license taxes either separately or cumulatively have restricted or are likely to restrict petitioners' religious activities. On their face they are a restriction of the free exercise of those freedoms which are protected by the First Amendment.

The taxes imposed by this ordinance can hardly help but be as severe and telling in their impact on the freedom [319 U.S. 105, 115] of the press and religion as the 'taxes on knowledge' at which the First Amendment was partly aimed. Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, 297 U.S. at pages 244-249, 56 S.Ct. at pages 446-449. They may indeed operate even more subtly. Itinerant evangelists moving throughout a state or from state to state would feel immediately the cumulative effect of such ordinances as they become fashionable. The way of the religious dissenter has long been hard. But if the formula of this type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of religious minorities will have been found. This method of disseminating religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town, village by village. The spread of religious ideas through personal visitations by the literature ministry of numerous religious groups would be stopped.

The fact that the ordinance is 'nondiscriminatory' is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.

It is claimed, however, that the ultimate question in determining the constitutionality of this license tax is whether the state has given something for which it can ask a return. That principle has wide applicability. State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 139 A.L.R. 1436, and cases cited. But it is quite irrelevant here. This tax is not a charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed by the state. The privilege in question exists apart from state authority. It is guaranteed the people by the federal constitution.

Considerable emphasis is placed on the kind of literature which petitioners were distributing – its provocative, [319 U.S. 105, 116] abusive, and ill-mannered character and the assault which it makes on our established churches and the cherished faiths of many of us. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. --, concurring opinion, decided this day. But those considerations are no justification for the license tax which the ordinance imposes. Plainly a community may not suppress, or the state tax, the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful. If that device were ever sanctioned, there would have been forged a ready instrument for the suppression of the faith which any minority cherishes but which does not happen to be in favor. That would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights.

Jehovah's Witnesses are not 'above the law'. But the present ordinance is not directed to the problems with which the police power of the state is free to deal. It does not cover, and petitioners are not charged with, breaches of the peace. They are pursuing their solicitations peacefully and quietly. Petitioners, moreover, are not charged with or prosecuted for the use of language which is obscene, abusive, or which incites retaliation. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra. Nor do we have here, as we did in Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, state regulation of the streets to protect and insure the safety, comfort, or convenience of the public. Furthermore, the present ordinance is not narrowly drawn to safeguard the people of the community in their homes against the evils of solicitations. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 306, 60 S.Ct. at page 904, 128 A.L.R. 1352. As we have said, it is not merely a registration ordinance calli ng for an identification of the solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the community. And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuses of solicitors. See Cox v. New Hampshire, [319 U.S. 105, 117] supra, 312 U.S. at pages 576, 577, 61 S.Ct. at pages 765, 766, 133 A.L.R. 1396. Nor can the present ordinance construed to apply only to solicitation from house to house survive if we assume that it has been.[10] The ordinance is not narrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils arising from that activity. Rather, it sets aside the residential areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied petitioners unless the tax is paid. That restraint and one which is city wide in scope (Jones v. Opelika) are different only in degree. Each is an abridgment of freedom of press and a restraint on the free exercise of religion. They stand or fall together.

The judgment in Jones v. Opelika has this day been vacated. Freed from that controlling precedent, we can restore to their high, constitutional position the liberties of itinerant evangelists who disseminate their religious beliefs and the tenets of their faith through distribution of literature. The judgments are reversed and the causes are remanded to the Pennsylvania Superior Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

 

[tkd4life]

Can someone please correct me if I'm wrong: No law is "unconstitutional" until it is determined to be so by the appropriate court. How many people were griping about Obamacare being unconstitutional, then guess what; SCOTUS tells them all to pound sand. Isn't this little exercise useless unless someone with a lot of money and someone with a law degree get together to make this go away?

Now the NRA will tell you "Give me your money and we will fight the big fight for you." yet here we are. Where are the people pulling together to take this to court? Where is the NRA? I'd much rather hear about that rather than the academic conversation like this.

 

[PJDiesel]

Where are the people pulling together to take this to court? Where is the NRA? I'd much rather hear about that rather than the academic conversation like this.

I can't answer for the NRA or any of the grassroots .orgs that exist. I can say it takes conversation like this to spawn REAL interest and action. We've all done a lot of talking in the last two years. Some have shelled out cash, some become test cases. This doesn't happen overnight, especially in a State where (it appears) the majority don't mind their rights being trampled.

 

[elwojo]

Read this:

http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2013RS/fnotes/bil_0001/sb0281.pdf

Page 19 gets to the heart of the fiscal matter and why the state is "overcharging". It's a jobs program.

Did anyone else get to Page 20 and start thinking "how many handguns?!"

DSP estimates a total of 85,051 firearms sales in the State in fiscal 2014; 92,798 in fiscal 2015; 100,544 in fiscal 2016; 108,291 in fiscal 2017; and 116,038 in fiscal 2018. DSP also assumes a similar growth rate in sales through fiscal 2023 at an annual growth rate of about 9%. Of the total, the number of sales expected to be handguns is as follows:
* fiscal 2014: 65,980
* fiscal 2015: 71,914
* fiscal 2016: 77,848
* fiscal 2017: 83,781
* fiscal 2018: 89,715

I somehow don't see the linear geometric growth working - especially in 2014 with the impacts of the HQL on the buying process. Which I am sure they will use to justify a need to increase the fee from $10 (despite moving to an automated system...)

 

[ShallNotInfringe]

Given:

Apps received since 10/1: 119309 - 117009 = 2,300.
And it's been 2 months.... 2300 × 6 = 13,800

The estimate is way off.

Reminds me of the smoking and kids health care program. Public health drive to have less smokers, less smokers to pay for the program, they estimated the contributions based on a fictitious number and then have a justification to raise the taxes more....

Oh yeah, you can count on the $10 going to $50 after this session to make up for the shortfall in handgun sales. And/or the HQL fee going up to $100.

 

[93confirmedkills]

Bump... Any more headway on this?

 

[robmints]

No. There is not enough money in the world to fight all the unconstitutionality in gun laws. It is how this even gets like this. Legislatures who are for or against something make so many unconstitutional laws the cost of fighting them all is impossible. Advocates try and fight them one by one on broad grounds, but the judges appointed are of like like mind as the legislatures, even when they must find in favor of the advocate, they do so on very narrow points. Then by the time the the advocate has rechallenged for a more broad interpretation the legislature passes a new unconstitutional law on the same infringement that must be litigated again. Or as Obama says when he does something that is unconstitutional, "sue me".

But as a direct answer, Jim Brochin is introducing a bill that would lower the fee to $25 I think. It's not written or submitted, IIRC it's sb176.

 

[robmints]

http://www.mdshooters.com/showthread.php?t=187911

Just couple threads down.