http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123621p.pdf
There you have it. The third circuit says that going from one state to another is only protected if you're going there in a vehicle, and not by any other means.
In our view, plaintiff here has failed to satisfy even the
first requirement of the first step of the process, i.e., that
Congress intended that section 926A benefit this particular
plaintiff. This is evident from the plain meaning of the statute.
Although the unwieldy sentence that comprises section 926A
is drafted in a roundabout way, on a careful reading its
language is clear and unambiguous. It begins by establishing
a clear positive entitlement: a person who meets its
requirements “shall be entitled” to transport firearms in
certain circumstances. Cf. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287
(contrasting the rights-creating language of “no person . . .
shall be . . . subjected” with language typical of spending
clause statutes, e.g., “no funds shall be made available.”). But
the part of the sentence that immediately follows expressly
conditions this entitlement as only being operative “if, during
such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the
firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily
directly accessible from the passenger
compartment of such transporting vehicle.” 18 U.S.C. § 926A
(emphasis supplied).
It is plain from the latter condition that the statute
protects only transportation of a firearm in a vehicle, and
requires that the firearm and ammunition be neither readily
nor directly accessible from the passenger compartment of
such vehicle. In particular, the word “such,” in “such
transporting vehicle,” by definition refers back to earlier
part(s) of the sentence, and the only parts it could possibly
refer to are the parts referring to the transportation of a
firearm or ammunition. The use of “such” therefore makes
clear that the transportation the statute protects must occur in
a “transporting vehicle.”
...
In light of the plain meaning of the statute, fully
corroborated by the legislative history, we hold that section
926A benefits only those who wish to transport firearms in
vehicles—and not, therefore, any of the kinds of
“transportation” that, by necessity, would be involved should
a person like those represented by the Association wish to
transport a firearm by foot through an airport terminal or Port
Authority site.
There you have it. The third circuit says that going from one state to another is only protected if you're going there in a vehicle, and not by any other means.