Patrick
MSI Executive Member
Mark/Krucam was on to something yesterday in his feeling the 4th is more open to our arguments than not.
This case has huge implications. (Volokh)
Chester is about a misdemeanor convict for domestic abuse looking to have a gun at home. WV says he cannot. It made its way up to the Appellate level )Circuit) in Richmod, and they are sending it back for more finding and determination.
BUT...they set some rules for anlaysis of Chester's claim. These rules are quite the bonanza for us. Here's how Volokh reads it (and so far I agree with him):
Volokh picks the following passage from the 4th's opinion as seminal:
Interesting stuff here. This reasoning comes from a three judge panel (1 dissenting) in our Fourth Circuit. It's value extends far beyond the misdemeanant's case - those rules are going to be applied to other 2A cases. This means our own Woollard.
Gansler should have fought early and fought hard. This decision from the 4th is going to be real hard for him to get around. It all but says carry for law-abiding people requires strict scrutiny. Gansler's delaying tactics were probably a gambit that time would provide him a stronger defense...that may well have backfired big time.
In caveat...I have not read this full opinion in depth. I bring this to you from Volokh and hope he has it right. He's usually pretty good at the high-level stuff.
This case has huge implications. (Volokh)
Chester is about a misdemeanor convict for domestic abuse looking to have a gun at home. WV says he cannot. It made its way up to the Appellate level )Circuit) in Richmod, and they are sending it back for more finding and determination.
BUT...they set some rules for anlaysis of Chester's claim. These rules are quite the bonanza for us. Here's how Volokh reads it (and so far I agree with him):
The panel opinion, as I read it, endorses a three-tier level of review, at least for substantial restrictions on gun possession such as the one here (as opposed to milder burdens on gun possession):
(1) Historically accepted exceptions to gun rights (at least ones accepted as of the Framing, and perhaps some more) are constitutional.
(2) Substantial restrictions on gun possession that fall within the core of Second Amendment protection, described by the panel as “the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense” (note the inclusion of carrying, and not just possession in the home, as some courts have said), are probably subject to strict scrutiny.
(3) Substantial restrictions on gun possession that are neither historically accepted nor applicable to “law-abiding, responsible citizen... possess[ing] and carry[ing] a weapon for self-defense” are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which calls for factual evaluation of whether the law is “substantially related” to a sufficiently “important government goal.” Since there will almost always be an important government goal to which the government could point — preventing death, injury, and violent crime — the main questions will likely be (a) what sort of factual evidence the government will have to show, and (b) to what extent will courts demand that the evidence specifically justify not just some restrictions but life-long (or very long-term) restrictions.
Volokh picks the following passage from the 4th's opinion as seminal:
Some courts have treated Heller’s listing of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” for all practical purposes, as a kind of “safe harbor” for unlisted regulatory measures, such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which they deem to be analogous to those measures specifically listed in Heller. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We see no reason to exclude § 922(g)(9) from the list of longstanding prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt.”). This approach, however, approximates rational-basis review, which has been rejected by Heller. In fact, the phrase “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” suggests the possibility that one or more of these “longstanding” regulations “could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.” United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
In view of the fact that Heller ultimately found the District’s gun regulations invalid “under any standard of scrutiny,” it appears to us that the Court would apply some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny if a historical evaluation did not end the matter. The government bears the burden of justifying its regulation in the context of heightened scrutiny review; using Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” to find § 922(g)(9) constitutional by analogy would relieve the government of its burden.
Thus, a two-part approach to Second Amendment claims seems appropriate under Heller, as explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Sykes in the now-vacated Skoien panel opinion. The first question is “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the challenged law is valid.
If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-end scrutiny. Heller left open the issue of the standard of review, rejecting only rational-basis review. Accordingly, unless the conduct at issue is not protected by the Second Amendment at all, the Government bears the burden of justifying the constitutional validity of the law....
[W]e are certainly not able to say that the Second Amendment, as historically understood, did not apply to persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. We must assume, therefore, that Chester’s Second Amendment rights are intact and that he is entitled to some measure of Second Amendment protection to keep and possess firearms in his home for self-defense. The question then becomes whether the government can justify, under the appropriate level of scrutiny, the burden imposed on Chester’s Second Amendment rights by § 922(g)(9)....
Given Heller’s focus on “core” Second Amendment conduct and the Court’s frequent references to First Amendment doctrine, we agree with those who advocate looking to the First Amendment as a guide in developing a standard of review for the Second Amendment. In the analogous First Amendment context, the level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right. For example, a “content-based speech restriction” on noncommercial speech is permissible “only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.” But, courts review content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations using an intermediate level of scrutiny. Likewise, a law regulating commercial speech is subject to a more lenient intermediate standard of scrutiny in light of “its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.” As Judge Sykes observed in the now-vacated Skoien panel opinion: “The Second Amendment is no more susceptible to a one-size-fits-all standard of review than any other constitutional right....”
Although Chester asserts his right to possess a firearm in his home for the purpose of self-defense, we believe his claim is not within the core right identified in Heller — the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense — by virtue of Chester’s criminal history as a domestic violence misdemeanant. Accordingly, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated persons. Accordingly, the government must demonstrate under the intermediate scrutiny standard that there is a “reasonable fit” between the challenged regulation and a “substantial” government objective. Significantly, intermediate scrutiny places the burden of establishing the required fit squarely upon the government.
Interesting stuff here. This reasoning comes from a three judge panel (1 dissenting) in our Fourth Circuit. It's value extends far beyond the misdemeanant's case - those rules are going to be applied to other 2A cases. This means our own Woollard.
Gansler should have fought early and fought hard. This decision from the 4th is going to be real hard for him to get around. It all but says carry for law-abiding people requires strict scrutiny. Gansler's delaying tactics were probably a gambit that time would provide him a stronger defense...that may well have backfired big time.
In caveat...I have not read this full opinion in depth. I bring this to you from Volokh and hope he has it right. He's usually pretty good at the high-level stuff.