En banc Decision in Peruta -- a loss

Something that dawned on me this morning.
If this case is denied Cert why cant someone file in a friendly court then when the Judge rules its legal , say it is Nationwide. It worked for the Dems with the travel ban.

frogman68 said:

Something that dawned on me this morning.
If this case is denied Cert why cant someone file in a friendly court then when the Judge rules its legal , say it is Nationwide. It worked for the Dems with the travel ban.

Click to expand...

There's no more friendly courts left that haven't already been challenged specifically with regard to May Issue.
On the broader right to carry issue there are some state courts that could be challenged based on denying non residents the ability to carry in that state.
The decisions would only be good in those jurisdictions though.

kcbrown said:

OK.




Yes. But now we have an active police force that the courts presume improves public safety. Historical understanding does nothing to change that fact.

If your argument is that the definition of public safety is that which was understood at the time of ratification of the Constitution, well, Good Luck With That. I'd love to see jurisprudence to that effect. I'm betting there is none.




That will be irrelevant to the courts, unless you can show that police forces are generally abusive in the same way. Otherwise, the court will simply conclude that the existence of an active police force has a beneficial effect on public safety because that's what the government will argue (with backing statistics, naturally) and thus it's what the court will buy by default.




What? No, that doesn't follow. You can't use lack of safety of the individual in and of itself to conclude that public safety is an aggregate of individual self defense (really, an aggregate of individual safety). The latter doesn't logically follow from the former except when public safety is the aggregate of individual safety (a definition that the courts have not adopted. See below), and the government will just counter with the claim that public safety is maintained even if some individuals are not safe on an individual basis.

You can use the lack of safety provided by the government to the individual to show that public safety is lower in the presence of laws forbidding effective individual self defense than it is in the absence of such laws, but to do that you have to first convince the court that public safety is the aggregate of individual safety.

So it sounds like your argument hinges on a definition. But the courts have already been using something other than the definition of public safety that is compatible with your argument, because if they had been using the definition you seem to be proposing, then they'd have concluded that the government has some duty to protect individuals since failing to protect an individual would, in the absence of counteracting elements, lower the aggregate and thus yield a reduction of public safety.




Really? The courts do that all the time with speech.



Look, the bottom line is this. Either public safety is some quantitative thing or it's not. If it is, then you cannot win a public safety argument without showing quantitative effects, and that means using statistics. If it isn't, then you clearly have to show that public safety is actually something different than what the courts have been thinking it is, because courts have been deciding against the right on the basis of what they currently believe public safety to be.

Good Luck With That.



For the record, I don't disagree with your apparent definition of public safety. It is a logical definition. But the courts apparently do not agree with it, so I fail to see how this argument can possibly win in court, most especially given the implications adopting the definition would have on existing law, and particularly with respect to the "no duty to protect" doctrine that is currently in place.

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You don't understand what I am saying. You also seem to jump to conclusions about how the court will decide things without explaining how they have reached that conclusion via past precedent.

In Kolbe, both sides agreed that public safety was an important government interest, but they did not really define what that meant or who really provided it. What they did do was argue over whether there was a substantial/rational relationship between the law and public safety (scrutiny determination). MD used statistics to establish a relationship and Kolbe tried to used them to say there was not a substantial relationship. Quantitative numbers are important in this determination because larger numbers would mean that there was a relationship while small numbers would indicate that there is not a relationship. It does not do anything to establish who is supposed to provide public safety.

To determine who is supposed to provide public safety, we need to first look at the historical understanding. It indicates that the public was supposed to provide it. The modern understanding is a little different, but not as much as you think. The main component is from the individual protecting themselves and the public safety is the aggregation of the individuals. While there are other components to public safety such as from the police, they are essentially zero because there is no duty to protect. Other people do not have a duty to protect others (except homeowners have a duty to protect those they allow on their property, which seems to be part of the historical definition).

The reason they codified the second amendment is important. When Heller looked at the issue, they simply looked at the standing army and found that there are no issue between the pubic and the standing army. They failed to understand that one of the historical uses of the standing army was public safety and that this created clashes between the army and the public (ie Boston Massacre). This does not happen today because we removed the army from the equation. They were replaced by the police, which did not exist at the time. There have been numerous clashes with the police throughout our history. The BCPD decent decree is simply and example where the police were found to have violated rights on a systematic level.

We have only talked about one side of the argument, why the people themselves provide public safety. We have not addressed the other side, how the law is related to public safety. A quantitative argument is not going to address the nuances of who is negatively affecting public safety. The issues raised by the government are already illegal and it is not the law abiding citizen that is causing the issues. Additionally it is not the selling or possession (what the law actually prevents) that causes the issues, it is the illegal use that causes them.

When you get into a quantitative argument you are implicitly acknowledging that there is a relationship and that the issue is over how much. I am trying to frame the argument much differently. I don't care the quantity, the issue is that the people themselves need to be part of the solution and the law abiding people are not actually causing the problem. What the government is doing is actually taking away the ability to be part of the solution, which is why the amendment was written in the first place. This is because governments tend to trample the rights of their citizens.

Good or Bad

Today is the day, we shouldn't have to much much until 10 am this morning for some kind of answer.

Inigoes said:

Good or Bad

Today is the day, we shouldn't have to much much until 10 am this morning for some kind of answer.

Click to expand...

How do we know we'll have something today?

...it's not because the Legendary Lawyers of MDS have run out of things to argue...









...unsubscribed...

SWO Daddy said:

How do we know we'll have something today?

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It's the last scheduled conference of the 2016 term. It's unusual for the court to hold a petition over the summer.

The court has denied review in Peruta, over a dissent from Thomas and Gorsuch

Cert denied. Dissent from Gorsuch and Thomas

Denied cert, dissent from Thomas and Gorsuch

Damn, damn, damn.

Well sh*t.

This is not good at all with them denying Peruta. why am I not surprised??

That's disappointing. However I'm glad Gorsuch decented.

Not surprised. At least we know where Gorsuch is. Kennedy needs to be out out out!

I'm looking forward to about this time next year when the decision for Norman v Florida is issued....Open carry throughout the country.

The fact that Alito did not join the dissent tells me it's more than just Kennedy.

Also, interestingly Ginsberg and Sotomayor dissent from denial in Binderup.

Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017)
T​

[FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman][FONT=Times New Roman,Times New Roman]SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[/FONT][/FONT]

EDWARD PERUTA,​

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 16–894. Decided June 26, 2017​

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
The Second Amendment to the Constitution guaranteesthat "the right of the people to keep and bear Arm shall not be infringed." At issue in this case is whether that guarantee protects the right to carry firearms in public forself-defense. Neither party disputes that the issue is oneof national importance or that the courts of appeals havealready weighed in extensively. I would therefore grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
I California generally prohibits the average citizen fromcarrying a firearm in public spaces, either openly or concealed. With a few limited exceptions, the State prohibitsopen carry altogether. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§25850, 26350 (West 2012). It proscribes concealed carry unless a resident obtains a license by showing "good cause," amongother criteria, §§26150, 26155, and it authorizes counties to set rules for when an applicant has shown good cause,§26160.In the county where petitioners reside, the sheriff has interpreted "good cause" to require an applicant to show that he has a particularized need, substantiated by documentary evidence, to carry a firearm for self-defense. The sheriff ’s policy specifies that "concern for one’s personalsafety" does not "alone" satisfy this requirement. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Peruta
[/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]County of San Diego[/FONT][/FONT], 742 F. 3d 1144, 1148 (CA9 2014) 2

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THOMAS, J., dissenting ​

(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, an applicantmust show "a set of circumstances that distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and cause him to be placedin harm’s way." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id.[/FONT][/FONT], at 1169 (internal quotation marksand alterations omitted). "[A] typical citizen fearing forhis personal safety—by definition—cannot distinguishhimself from the mainstream." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Ibid. [/FONT][/FONT](emphasis deleted;internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). As a result, ordinary, "law-abiding, responsible citizens," [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]District of Columbia [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Heller[/FONT][/FONT], 554 U. S. 570, 635 (2008), may not obtain a permit for concealed carry of a firearm inpublic spaces.
Petitioners are residents of San Diego County (plus an association with numerous county residents as members)who are unable to obtain a license for concealed carry due to the county’s policy and, because the State generally bans open carry, are thus unable to bear firearms in public in any manner. They sued under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C. §1983, alleging that this near-total prohibition on public carry violates their Second Amendment right tobear arms. They requested declaratory and injunctiverelief to prevent the sheriff from denying licenses based on his restrictive interpretation of "good cause," as well asother "relief as the Court deems just and proper." First Amended Complaint in No. 3:09–cv–02371, (SD Cal.) ¶¶149, 150, 152. The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and petitioners appealedto the Ninth Circuit.
In a thorough opinion, a panel of the Ninth Circuitreversed. 742 F. 3d 1144. The panel examined the constitutional text and this Court’s precedents, as well as historical sources from before the founding era through the endof the 19th century. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id., [/FONT][/FONT]at 1150–1166. Based on these sources, the court concluded that "the carrying of an operable handgun outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense . . . constitutes ‘bear[ing] Arms’ within the 3

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HOMAS, J., dissenting ​

meaning of the Second Amendment." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id.[/FONT][/FONT], at 1166. It thus reversed the District Court and held that the sheriff ’s interpretation of "good cause" in combination with the other aspects of the State’s regime violated the SecondAmendment’s command that a State "permit [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]some form [/FONT][/FONT]of carry for self-defense outside the home." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id., [/FONT][/FONT]at 1172.
The Ninth Circuit [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]sua sponte [/FONT][/FONT]granted rehearing en banc and, by a divided court, reversed the panel decision. In the en banc court’s view, because petitioners specifically asked for the invalidation of the sheriff ’s "good cause"interpretation, their legal challenge was limited to thataspect of the applicable regulatory scheme. The court thus declined to "answer the question of whether or to what degree the Second Amendment might or might not protect a right of a member of the general public to carry firearmsopenly in public." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Peruta [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]County of San Diego[/FONT][/FONT], 824
F. 3d 919, 942 (2016). It instead held only that "the Second Amendment does not preserve or protect a right of a member of the general public to carry [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]concealed [/FONT][/FONT]firearms in public." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id., [/FONT][/FONT]at 924 (emphasis added).
II We should have granted certiorari in this case. The approach taken by the en banc court is indefensible, and the petition raises important questions that this Courtshould address. I see no reason to await another case.
A The en banc court’s decision to limit its review to whether the Second Amendment protects the right toconcealed carry—as opposed to the more general right topublic carry—was untenable. Most fundamentally, it wasnot justified by the terms of the complaint, which calledinto question the State’s regulatory scheme as a whole. See First Amended Complaint ¶63 ("Because California does not permit the open carriage of loaded firearms, 4

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THOMAS, J., dissenting ​

concealed carriage with a [concealed carry] permit is theonly means by which an individual can bear arms in public places"); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]id.[/FONT][/FONT], ¶74 ("States may not completely ban the carrying of handguns for self-defense"). And although thecomplaint specified the remedy that intruded least on the State’s overall regulatory regime—declaratory relief and an injunction against the sheriff ’s restrictive interpretation of "good cause"—it also requested "[a]ny further reliefas the Court deems just and proper." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id., [/FONT][/FONT]¶152.
Nor was the Ninth Circuit’s approach justified by the history of this litigation. The District Court emphasized that "the heart of the parties’ dispute" is whether theSecond Amendment protects "the right to carry a loadedhandgun in public, either openly or in a concealed manner." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Peruta [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]County of San Diego[/FONT][/FONT], 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106,1109 (SD Cal. 2010). As the Ninth Circuit panel pointed out, "[petitioners] argue that the San Diego County policy in light of the California licensing scheme [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]as a whole [/FONT][/FONT]violates the Second Amendment because it precludes a responsible, law-abiding citizen from carrying a weapon inpublic for the purpose of lawful self-defense in [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]any [/FONT][/FONT]manner." 742 F. 3d, at 1171. The panel further observed thatalthough petitioners "focu" their challenge on the "licensing scheme for concealed carry," this is "for goodreason: acquiring such a license is the only practical avenue by which [they] may come lawfully to carry a gun for self-defense in San Diego County." [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Ibid. [/FONT][/FONT]Even the en banc court acknowledged that petitioners "base their argumenton the entirety of California’s statutory scheme" and "do [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]not [/FONT][/FONT]contend that there is a free-standing Second Amendment right to carry concealed firearms." 824 F. 3d, at 927.
B Had the en banc Ninth Circuit answered the questionactually at issue in this case, it likely would have been compelled to reach the opposite result. This Court has 5
Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) THOMAS, J., dissenting
already suggested that the Second Amendment protectsthe right to carry firearms in public in some fashion. As we explained in [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Heller[/FONT][/FONT], to "bear arms" means to "‘wear, bear, or carry upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’" 554 U. S., at 584 (quoting [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Muscarello [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]United States[/FONT][/FONT], 524 U. S. 125, 143 (1998) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted). The most natural reading of this definition encompasses public carry. I find it extremely improbable that the Framers understood the Second Amendment to protectlittle more than carrying a gun from the bedroom to the kitchen. See [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Drake [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Filko[/FONT][/FONT], 724 F. 3d 426, 444 (CA32013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting) ("To speak of ‘bearing’ arms solely within one’s home not only would conflate ‘bearing’ with ‘keeping,’ in derogation of the [[FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Heller[/FONT][/FONT]]Court’s holding that the verbs codified distinct rights, butalso would be awkward usage given the meaning assigned the terms by the Supreme Court"); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Moore [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Madigan[/FONT][/FONT], 702
F. 3d 933, 936 (CA7 2012) (similar).
The relevant history appears to support this understanding. The panel opinion below pointed to a wealth ofcases and secondary sources from England, the founding era, the antebellum period, and Reconstruction, whichtogether strongly suggest that the right to bear arms includes the right to bear arms in public in some manner.See 742 F. 3d, at 1153–1166 (canvassing the relevant history in detail); Brief for National Rifle Association as [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Amicus Curiae [/FONT][/FONT]6–16. For example, in [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Nunn [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]State[/FONT][/FONT], 1 Ga. 243 (1846)—a decision the [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Heller [/FONT][/FONT]Court discussed extensively as illustrative of the proper understanding of the right, 554 U. S., at 612—the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a ban on open carry although it upheld a ban on concealed carry. 1 Ga., at 251. Other cases similarly suggest that, although some regulation of public carry is 6

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THOMAS, J., dissenting ​

permissible, an effective ban on all forms of public carry is not. See, [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]e.g., State [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Reid[/FONT][/FONT], 1 Ala. 612, 616–617 (1840) ("A statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional").
Finally, the Second Amendment’s core purpose furthersupports the conclusion that the right to bear arms extends to public carry. The Court in [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Heller [/FONT][/FONT]emphasizedthat "self-defense" is "the [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]central component [/FONT][/FONT]of the [SecondAmendment] right itself." 554 U. S., at 599. This purposeis not limited only to the home, even though the need for self-defense may be "most acute" there. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id., [/FONT][/FONT]at 628. "Selfdefense has to take place wherever the person happens tobe," and in some circumstances a person may be morevulnerable in a public place than in his own house. Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1515 (2009).
C Even if other Members of the Court do not agree that the Second Amendment likely protects a right to publiccarry, the time has come for the Court to answer this important question definitively. Twenty-six States haveasked us to resolve the question presented, see Brief for Alabama et al. as [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Amici Curiae[/FONT][/FONT], and the lower courts have fully vetted the issue. At least four other Courts of Appeals and three state courts of last resort have decided cases regarding the ability of States to regulate the public carry of firearms. Those decisions (plus the one below) have produced thorough opinions on both sides of theissue. See [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Drake[/FONT][/FONT], 724 F. 3d 426, cert. denied [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]sub nom. Drake [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Jerejian[/FONT][/FONT], 572 U. S. ___ (2014); 724 F. 3d, at 440 (Hardiman, J., dissenting); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Woollard [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Gallagher[/FONT][/FONT], 712
F. 3d 865 (CA4), cert. denied, 571 U. S. ___ (2013); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Ka[/FONT][/FONT][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]7
Cite as: 582 U. S. ____ (2017) T[/FONT][/FONT][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]HOMAS[/FONT][/FONT][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook], J., dissenting
[/FONT][/FONT][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]chalsky [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]County of Westchester[/FONT][/FONT], 701 F. 3d 81 (CA2 2012), cert. denied [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]sub nom[/FONT][/FONT]. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Kachalsky [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Cacace[/FONT][/FONT], 569 U. S. ___ (2013); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Madigan[/FONT][/FONT], 702 F. 3d 933; [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]id., [/FONT][/FONT]at 943 (Williams, J., dissenting); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Commonwealth [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Gouse[/FONT][/FONT], 461 Mass. 787, 800– 802, 965 N. E. 2d 774, 785–786 (2012); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Williams [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]State[/FONT][/FONT], 417 Md. 479, 496, 10 A. 3d 1167, 1177 (2011); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Mack [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]United States[/FONT][/FONT], 6 A. 3d 1224, 1236 (D. C. 2010). Hence, I do not see much value in waiting for additional courts toweigh in, especially when constitutional rights are atstake.
The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of the SecondAmendment as a disfavored right. See [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Friedman [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Highland Park[/FONT][/FONT], 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 6) ("The Court’srefusal to review a decision that flouts two of our Second Amendment precedents stands in marked contrast to the Court’s willingness to summarily reverse courts thatdisregard our other constitutional decisions"); [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Jackson [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]City and County of San Francisco[/FONT][/FONT], 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (same). The Constitution does not rank certain rights above others, and I do not think this Court should impose such a hierarchy by selectively enforcing its preferred rights. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Id.[/FONT][/FONT], at ___ (slip op., at 1) ("Second Amendment rights are no less protected by our Constitution thanother rights enumerated in that document"). The Court has not heard argument in a Second Amendment case in over seven years—since March 2, 2010, in [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]McDonald [/FONT][/FONT]v. [FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook][FONT=Century Schoolbook,Century Schoolbook]Chicago[/FONT][/FONT], 561 U. S. 742. Since that time, we have heard argument in, for example, roughly 35 cases where the question presented turned on the meaning of the FirstAmendment and 25 cases that turned on the meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment. This discrepancy is inexcusable, especially given how much less developed our jurisprudence is with respect to the Second Amendment as compared to the First and Fourth Amendments. 8

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For those of us who work in marbled halls, guarded constantly by a vigilant and dedicated police force, theguarantees of the Second Amendment might seem antiquated and superfluous. But the Framers made a clear choice: They reserved to all Americans the right to beararms for self-defense. I do not think we should stand by idly while a State denies its citizens that right, particularlywhen their very lives may depend on it. I respectfullydissent.

The problematic phrase in the dissent is

Even if other Members of the Court do not agree that the Second Amendment likely protects a right to public carry, the time has come for the Court to answer this important question definitively.

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It is probably not just Kennedy that thinks that the 2nd amendment does not protect public carry. I would not get hopes up for Norman, Baker or any other case until we see a few retirements.

I have to say that I don't expect SCOTUS to take a 2A case until Kennedy or a Leftist Justice is replaced. There's too much at stake, a loss at that level loses everything.