history: "Reasonable precaution against apprehended danger"

fidelity · Sep 10, 2015

Just a thought - esp when I've read strategies in dealing with the HPRB and mentioning a MDSP official's name (people do Google themselves sometimes). You're not being a "sissy" if discussing legal strategies outside the earshot of adversaries. Not that the WC is much more secure ...

Jaybeez · Sep 11, 2015

fidelity said:
Great thread. Understand why it is here (as the HPRB meeting threads are) as crowd sourcing opinions and disseminating these ideas are probably done most efficiently where publicly viewable, but wonder if it reciprocally helps those uninterested in rights (and are motivated to retain power/authority) to be better prepared to address how they've corrupted the law.

1. either i'm right, and they are wrong and their policies are indefensible

2. or im wrong, and it doesnt matter

If it's #1, the more of us that know this, the better.

EDIT TO ADD, I've pm'd this thread to some of the brain trust here on MDS, and i'm anxious to get their input., either posted or in pm's.

esqappellate · Sep 13, 2015

Try as I might, I cannot seem to make much headway in seeing how this history of the phrase helps us that much in securing a carry permit underMD Code, Public Safety, § 5-306.

The phrase "a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger" is currently used in MD Code, Criminal Law, § 4-101. Section 4-101(c)(1) provides that "A person may not wear or carry a dangerous weapon of any kind concealed on or about the person.
(2) A person may not wear or carry a dangerous weapon, chemical mace, pepper mace, or a tear gas device openly with the intent or purpose of injuring an individual in an unlawful manner.

However, 4-101 also provides that "(b) This section does not prohibit the following individuals from carrying a weapon:

(1) an officer of the State, or of any county or municipal corporation of the State, who is entitled or required to
carry the weapon as part of the officer's official equipment, or by any conservator of the peace, who is entitled
or required to carry the weapon as part of the conservator's official equipment, or by any officer or conservator
of the peace of another state who is temporarily in this State;
(2) a special agent of a railroad;
(3) a holder of a permit to carry a handgun issued under Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Public Safety Article; or
(4) an individual who carries the weapon as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger, subject to the right of the court in an action arising under this section to judge the reasonableness of the carrying of the weapon, and the proper occasion for carrying it, under the evidence in the case.

This proviso makes clear(?) that a person carrying a dangerous weapon (other than a handgun) does not violate the prohibitions on the carriage of a weapon specified in 4-101 "if an individual who carries the weapon as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger, subject to the right of the court in an action arising under this section to judge the reasonableness of the carrying." So such an individual has a defense to the 4-101 charge under this provision. It is a *very* iffy defense, but it is at least a defense that counsel can raise and take to the jury in a given prosecution under 4-101.

Handguns used to be in 4-101 (the predecessor that is) and thus that exception applied to handguns too. But, in 1972, the GA moved handguns prohibitions out of 4-101 into what is now 4-203, which generally bans the possession and carrying of handguns in MD, subject to specified exceptions there listed, including having a permit under 5-306. The phrase "a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger" is now incorporated into the GS requirement for that permit, viz., "has good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger."

As thus incorporated, it seems facially reasonable that the "apprehended danger" finding be objective, as that finding is "based on an investigation" and the requirement is that it is "a reasonable precaution," as determined by the MSP. This legislative history makes clear that the 1972 changes were designed to make it far more difficult to legally carry a handgun, since it now requires (unlike pre 1972) that the "reasonable precaution" showing be made ahead of time, not on an ad hoc basis limited to a particular time and place, and only then as a finding sufficient for the issuance of a permit, which is only issued by the MSP after an investigation. See Colby v. State, 362 Md. 702, 766 A.2d 639 (2001) (discussing the 1972 legislation and what is now MD Code, Criminal Law, § 4-101 and 5-306). This places that "reasonable precaution" determination squarely in the lap of the MSP, not the individual. That differs radically from the pre 1972 treatment of handguns, and for that matter, the current treatment accorded "weapons" in 4-101. It is very hard to argue from this statutory scheme that the case-by-case inquiry of personal apprehension of danger that existed prior to 1972 for handguns and currently exists for other types of weapons under 4-101 should be imported into the post 1972 treatment of handgun permits. In fact, the 1972 changes all cut the opposite direction. Sorry.

Jaybeez · Sep 14, 2015

Esqappellate,

Thank you for taking the time to reply.

You stated that the 1972 changes were designed to make it far more difficult to legally carry a handgun. It seems to me that the statements of intent, 1-4 are making the opposite statement. That criminals were carrying illegally because they had criminal intent and no rpaad, and the intent of the legislation was to make it harder for criminals and those committing crimes to carry. Where do you find the suggestion that it should be harder for those with a rpaad and no criminal intent to access a permit to carry legally? Statement of intent #5 seems to say the opposite when read with the statement of intent from the 1974 law.

Biggfoot44 · Sep 14, 2015

During slack time in a previous session , I did research the 1972 Preamble at the Legislative Library, going thru the whole file of testamony. To cut to the chase, nothing there at all to adress the so call legislative finding. Zip, nada. Other than anti-gun newspaper and tabloid clippings w/o any numbers or statistics , the only evidence was a copy of the (since disgraced) Rockerfeller Commision Report.

But as historical background to the era , said Rockerfeller Report called for the outright banning of handguns. In those days there was wide support among Libs in Md and nationwide for Banning totally ( except for the proverbal Mil & Police ).

At the time Willie D positioned himself ( and was widely percieved ) to be very moderate and thoughtful to cut the baby in half , and split the difference.

esqappellate · Sep 14, 2015

Jaybeez said:
Esqappellate,

Thank you for taking the time to reply.

You stated that the 1972 changes were designed to make it far more difficult to legally carry a handgun. It seems to me that the statements of intent, 1-4 are making the opposite statement. That criminals were carrying illegally because they had criminal intent and no rpaad, and the intent of the legislation was to make it harder for criminals and those committing crimes to carry. Where do you find the suggestion that it should be harder for those with a rpaad and no criminal intent to access a permit to carry legally? Statement of intent #5 seems to say the opposite when read with the statement of intent from the 1974 law.

Pre 1972, a person carrying a handgun (without a permit) could defeat a criminal charge under 4-101 by making the showing of RPAAD. That would be an ad hoc determination on the particular facts present at the time of the arrest under 4-101. That is no longer possible after the 1972 changes. You simply cannot carry a handgun like that anymore. You have to have a permit. The only role for RPAAD is in the permit application where the MSP is the judge of the justification which is an objective inquiry done after an investigation. That means that RPAAD no longer an ad hoc determination or a defense to a criminal charge.

The argument is, as I understand it at least, that RPAAD in the post 1972 permitting process under 5-306 ought to mean the same thing as it did in pre-1972 context under 4-101, i.e., a person has RPAAD if that person lacks criminal intent and can articulate a RPAAD. It is not a bad argument, logically. I just don't think that the courts will find it very persuasive in light of the legislative changes that took place in 1972, as described in Crawford and Colby.

As those cases illustrate, courts typically interpret legislative language by reference to legislative intent all the time. The federal courts do the same. Indeed, federal courts and state courts typically defer to administrative constructions of ambiguous language the enforcement of which was given to an agency by the legislature. (e.g., Chevron deference).

Here, even though RPAAD literal words are the same post and pre 1972, the GA radically changed the context of how and when RPAAD is determined and by whom. It took RPAAD out of the context of ad hoc defense to a criminal charge under 4-101 (a circumstance that does not involve the MSP at all) and placed it in the permit context, where the MSP makes an objective determination of whether your RPAAD is good enough for the issuance of a permit in the judgment of the MSP. That process necessarily involves discretionary calls to which the courts will normally defer if they are not obviously arbitrary.

As Colby and Crawford make clear, all of these 1972 changes were designed to make it much harder to carry a handgun legally. Pre 1972, the GA did not want to put in jail someone carrying a handgun with RPAAD under 4-101, but, post 1972, it changed that law by taking a handgun carrying out of 4-101 entirely and enacting a flat ban on carry (in 4-203 with limited exceptions) and not only requiring a permit for such carrying but also endowing the MSP with discretion to assess the RPAAD articulated. Under this change, the absence of criminal intent and a perfectly good RPAAD are legally irrelevant if you are carrying a loaded handgun without a permit. You go to jail under 4-203 for up to 3 years, good intent and a RPAAD notwithstanding (with the very limited judicially implied exception of imminent need for self defense, as articulated in Crawford).

Harsh? You bet and that is exactly what the GA intended in their misplaced zeal. It makes it *much* easier to obtain convictions and, in the GA's collective primitive consciousness, that was ok because handguns were presumed to be evil (except in the hands of LEOs). The 2A right of armed self defense was never considered as it was considered to be well-established (at the time) that (1) the 2A did not apply to the states at all and (2) the 2A was only a collective right to keep and bear arms in a milita. MD had (and still has) no state constitutional counterpart to the 2d Amendment.

In short, the GA sharply limited the circumstances in which RPAAD was relevant and changed entirely who makes that determination (from a judge and jury on an ad hoc basis under 4-101, to the MSP on a predictive basis for a permit under 5-306). Again, the person's subjective justification and state of mind in an ad hoc situation is no longer relevant post 1972. Given the underlying legislative intent to make it much harder to legally carry and given the necessarily predictive nature of a permit RPAAD (a permit is good for 2 years initially and 3 years on renewal), it hardly is surprising that the MSP has been restrictive in its construction of RPAAD. I don't like it either, but the argument is, in my judgment, too slim a reed to bear the weight we would put on it.

redeemed.man · Sep 14, 2015

esqappellate said:
Pre 1972, a person carrying a handgun (without a permit) could defeat a criminal charge under 4-101 by making the showing of RPAAD. That would be an ad hoc determination on the particular facts present at the time of the arrest under 4-101. That is no longer possible after the 1972 changes. You simply cannot carry a handgun like that anymore. You have to have a permit. The only role for RPAAD is in the permit application where the MSP is the judge of the justification which is an objective inquiry done after an investigation. That means that RPAAD no longer an ad hoc determination or a defense to a criminal charge. The mere absence of criminal intent is not relevant.

The argument is, as I understand it at least, that RPAAD in the post 1972 permitting process under 5-306 ought to mean the same thing as it did in pre-1972 context under 4-101, i.e., a person has RPAAD if that person lacks criminal intent and can articulate a RPAAD. It is not a bad argument, logically. I just don't think that the courts will find it very persuasive in light of the legislative changes that took place in 1972, as described in Crawford and Colby.

As those cases illustrate, courts typically interpret legislative language by reference to legislative intent all the time. The federal courts do the same. Indeed, federal courts and state courts typically defer to administrative constructions of ambiguous language the enforcement of which was given to an agency by the legislature. (e.g., Chevron deference).

Here, even though RPAAD literal words are the same post and pre 1972, the GA radically changed the context of how and when RPAAD is determined and by whom. It took RPAAD out of the context of ad hoc defense to a criminal charge under 4-101 (a circumstance that does not involve the MSP at all) and placed it in the permit context, where the MSP makes an objective determination of the whether your RPAAD is good enough for the issuance of a permit in the judgment of the MSP. That process necessarily involves discretionary calls to which the courts will normally defer if they are not obviously arbitrary.

As Colby and Crawford make clear, all of these 1972 changes were designed to make it much harder to carry a handgun legally. Pre 1972, the GA did not want to put in jail someone carrying a handgun with RPAAD under 4-101, but, post 1972, it changed that law by taking a handgun carrying out of 4-101 entirely and enacting a flat ban on carry (in 4-203 with limited exceptions) and not only requiring a permit for such carrying but also endowing the MSP with discretion to assess the RPAAD articulated. Under this change, the absence of criminal intent and a perfectly good RPAAD are legally irrelevant if you are carrying a loaded handgun without a permit. You go to jail under 4-203 for up to 3 years, good intent and a RPAAD notwithstanding. Harsh? You bet and that is exactly what the GA intended in their misplaced zeal. It makes it *much* easier to obtain convictions and, in the GA's collective primitive consciousness, that was ok because handguns were presumed to be evil (except in the hands of LEOs).

In short, the GA sharply limited the circumstances in which RPAAD was relevant and changed entirely who makes that determination (from a judge and jury on an ad hoc basis under 4-101, to the MSP on a predictive basis for a permit under 5-306). Again, the person's subjective justification and state of mind in an ad hoc situation is no longer relevant post 1972. Given the underlying legislative intent to make it much harder to legally carry and given the necessarily predictive nature of a permit RPAAD (a permit is good for 2 years initially and 3 years on renewal), it hardly is surprising that the MSP has been restrictive in its construction of RPAAD. I don't like it either, but the argument is, in my judgment, too slim a reed to bear the weight we would put on it.

Even when I don't like your answers, you are a true blessing to our community. Thank you for sharing your wisdom and experience with us.

Jaybeez · Sep 14, 2015

esqappellate said:
Pre 1972, a person carrying a handgun (without a permit) could defeat a criminal charge under 4-101 by making the showing of RPAAD. That would be an ad hoc determination on the particular facts present at the time of the arrest under 4-101. That is no longer possible after the 1972 changes. You simply cannot carry a handgun like that anymore. You have to have a permit. The only role for RPAAD is in the permit application where the MSP is the judge of the justification which is an objective inquiry done after an investigation. That means that RPAAD no longer an ad hoc determination or a defense to a criminal charge.

The argument is, as I understand it at least, that RPAAD in the post 1972 permitting process under 5-306 ought to mean the same thing as it did in pre-1972 context under 4-101, i.e., a person has RPAAD if that person lacks criminal intent and can articulate a RPAAD. It is not a bad argument, logically. I just don't think that the courts will find it very persuasive in light of the legislative changes that took place in 1972, as described in Crawford and Colby.

As those cases illustrate, courts typically interpret legislative language by reference to legislative intent all the time. The federal courts do the same. Indeed, federal courts and state courts typically defer to administrative constructions of ambiguous language the enforcement of which was given to an agency by the legislature. (e.g., Chevron deference).

Here, even though RPAAD literal words are the same post and pre 1972, the GA radically changed the context of how and when RPAAD is determined and by whom. It took RPAAD out of the context of ad hoc defense to a criminal charge under 4-101 (a circumstance that does not involve the MSP at all) and placed it in the permit context, where the MSP makes an objective determination of the whether your RPAAD is good enough for the issuance of a permit in the judgment of the MSP. That process necessarily involves discretionary calls to which the courts will normally defer if they are not obviously arbitrary.

As Colby and Crawford make clear, all of these 1972 changes were designed to make it much harder to carry a handgun legally. Pre 1972, the GA did not want to put in jail someone carrying a handgun with RPAAD under 4-101, but, post 1972, it changed that law by taking a handgun carrying out of 4-101 entirely and enacting a flat ban on carry (in 4-203 with limited exceptions) and not only requiring a permit for such carrying but also endowing the MSP with discretion to assess the RPAAD articulated. Under this change, the absence of criminal intent and a perfectly good RPAAD are legally irrelevant if you are carrying a loaded handgun without a permit. You go to jail under 4-203 for up to 3 years, good intent and a RPAAD notwithstanding (with the very limited judicially implied exception of imminent need for self defense, as articulated in Crawford).

Harsh? You bet and that is exactly what the GA intended in their misplaced zeal. It makes it *much* easier to obtain convictions and, in the GA's collective primitive consciousness, that was ok because handguns were presumed to be evil (except in the hands of LEOs). The 2A right of armed self defense was never considered as it was considered to be well-established (at the time) that (1) the 2A did not apply to the states at all and (2) the 2A was only a collective right to keep and bears arms in a milita. MD had (and still has) no state constitutional counterpart to the 2d Amendment.

In short, the GA sharply limited the circumstances in which RPAAD was relevant and changed entirely who makes that determination (from a judge and jury on an ad hoc basis under 4-101, to the MSP on a predictive basis for a permit under 5-306). Again, the person's subjective justification and state of mind in an ad hoc situation is no longer relevant post 1972. Given the underlying legislative intent to make it much harder to legally carry and given the necessarily predictive nature of a permit RPAAD (a permit is good for 2 years initially and 3 years on renewal), it hardly is surprising that the MSP has been restrictive in its construction of RPAAD. I don't like it either, but the argument is, in my judgment, too slim a reed to bear the weight we would put on it.

you bolded irrelevant. doesnt andersen say that it is relevant?

i bolded "judgement", a word that was specifically stripped out of the 72 bill during its passage, and replaced with "a finding". a word with a subtle dictionary difference.

im not necessarily interested if the courts like my argument. im more interested if members of the hbrb could run with it.

i see you put a lot of thought into your replies. where do you think the msp super and board should draw from to determine what their standard of rpaad should be, other than "the way it was done by the guy before me"?

Mike · Sep 14, 2015

esqappellate said:
Pre 1972, a person carrying a handgun (without a permit) could defeat a criminal charge under 4-101 by making the showing of RPAAD. That would be an ad hoc determination on the particular facts present at the time of the arrest under 4-101. That is no longer possible after the 1972 changes. You simply cannot carry a handgun like that anymore. You have to have a permit. The only role for RPAAD is in the permit application where the MSP is the judge of the justification which is an objective inquiry done after an investigation. That means that RPAAD no longer an ad hoc determination or a defense to a criminal charge.

The argument is, as I understand it at least, that RPAAD in the post 1972 permitting process under 5-306 ought to mean the same thing as it did in pre-1972 context under 4-101, i.e., a person has RPAAD if that person lacks criminal intent and can articulate a RPAAD. It is not a bad argument, logically. I just don't think that the courts will find it very persuasive in light of the legislative changes that took place in 1972, as described in Crawford and Colby.

As those cases illustrate, courts typically interpret legislative language by reference to legislative intent all the time. The federal courts do the same. Indeed, federal courts and state courts typically defer to administrative constructions of ambiguous language the enforcement of which was given to an agency by the legislature. (e.g., Chevron deference).

Here, even though RPAAD literal words are the same post and pre 1972, the GA radically changed the context of how and when RPAAD is determined and by whom. It took RPAAD out of the context of ad hoc defense to a criminal charge under 4-101 (a circumstance that does not involve the MSP at all) and placed it in the permit context, where the MSP makes an objective determination of the whether your RPAAD is good enough for the issuance of a permit in the judgment of the MSP. That process necessarily involves discretionary calls to which the courts will normally defer if they are not obviously arbitrary.

As Colby and Crawford make clear, all of these 1972 changes were designed to make it much harder to carry a handgun legally. Pre 1972, the GA did not want to put in jail someone carrying a handgun with RPAAD under 4-101, but, post 1972, it changed that law by taking a handgun carrying out of 4-101 entirely and enacting a flat ban on carry (in 4-203 with limited exceptions) and not only requiring a permit for such carrying but also endowing the MSP with discretion to assess the RPAAD articulated. Under this change, the absence of criminal intent and a perfectly good RPAAD are legally irrelevant if you are carrying a loaded handgun without a permit. You go to jail under 4-203 for up to 3 years, good intent and a RPAAD notwithstanding (with the very limited judicially implied exception of imminent need for self defense, as articulated in Crawford).

Harsh? You bet and that is exactly what the GA intended in their misplaced zeal. It makes it *much* easier to obtain convictions and, in the GA's collective primitive consciousness, that was ok because handguns were presumed to be evil (except in the hands of LEOs). The 2A right of armed self defense was never considered as it was considered to be well-established (at the time) that (1) the 2A did not apply to the states at all and (2) the 2A was only a collective right to keep and bears arms in a milita. MD had (and still has) no state constitutional counterpart to the 2d Amendment.

In short, the GA sharply limited the circumstances in which RPAAD was relevant and changed entirely who makes that determination (from a judge and jury on an ad hoc basis under 4-101, to the MSP on a predictive basis for a permit under 5-306). Again, the person's subjective justification and state of mind in an ad hoc situation is no longer relevant post 1972. Given the underlying legislative intent to make it much harder to legally carry and given the necessarily predictive nature of a permit RPAAD (a permit is good for 2 years initially and 3 years on renewal), it hardly is surprising that the MSP has been restrictive in its construction of RPAAD. I don't like it either, but the argument is, in my judgment, too slim a reed to bear the weight we would put on it.

Thank you for the very clear summary of the situation. One thing in the bold text in the last paragraph of the quote... Is it worth a constitutional challenge to the law that it's written such that the MSP needs to be clairvoyant in order to predict RPAAD? (Also the long lead time to issue any CCW permit would seem to cause a defacto denial of the right to protect oneself.) I thought courts only dealt with fact, not speculation about what might occur?

esqappellate · Sep 14, 2015

Mike said:
Thank you for the very clear summary of the situation. One thing in the bold text in the last paragraph of the quote... Is it worth a constitutional challenge to the law that it's written such that the MSP needs to be clairvoyant in order to predict RPAAD? (Also the long lead time to issue any CCW permit would seem to cause a defacto denial of the right to protect oneself.) I thought courts only dealt with fact, not speculation about what might occur?

We had that challenge in Woollard. And lost. If you read the Fourth Circuit's opinion in that case, it is clear that the court would defer to the GA's judgment that the MSP should make this discretionary call, because the public safety demands that carrying handguns be limited. :rolleyes:

The next constitutional challenge to this permitting scheme will have to come after the SCT acts and clarifies the law (I think it will, at some point).

esqappellate · Sep 14, 2015

Jaybeez said:
you bolded irrelevant. doesnt andersen say that it is relevant?

i bolded "judgement", a word that was specifically stripped out of the 72 bill during its passage, and replaced with "a finding". a word with a subtle dictionary difference.

im not necessarily interested if the courts like my argument. im more interested if members of the hbrb could run with it.

i see you put a lot of thought into your replies. where do you think the msp super and board should draw from to determine what their standard of rpaad should be, other than "the way it was done by the guy before me"?

Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426, 614 A.2d 963 (1992) did not involve a gun. The Anderson court held that trial court improperly convicted defendant on determination that the utility knife he was carrying was dangerous and deadly weapon per se, without considering defendant's intent in fact. That consideration of intent is the proper test under 4-101 for non-listed dangerous weapons, i.e., that "[t]he person carrying the object must have at least the general intent to carry the instrument for its use as a weapon, either of offense or defense. It is a question of fact, to be decided based on all of the circumstances." Id. at 438. (The listed weapons in 4-101, e.g., Bowie Knives and Switchblades are considered under Anderson's reading of 4-101 to be per se dangerous weapons and need no such proof of intent). That is not the test for a conviction for carrying a handgun under 4-203. See Crawford. Heck, as Anderson holds, that intent inquiry does not even apply to the weapons specifically listed in 4-101. Note that Anderson did not purport to construe the meaning of RPAAD language found in 4-101. The intent element it addressed was separate from that.

I agree that 5-306 requires a "finding" based on an "investigation" as opposed to leaving the permit to the totally unbridled discretion of the MSP. I used "judgment" in that context as any such "finding" is always a judgment call, albeit a judgment call based on the RPAAD standard (which is very ambiguous). The RPAAD standard isn't much of a limitation on that judgment, but it is one that the Woollard court essentially said was real. See Woollard, 793 F.3d at 879-880. (I respectfully disagree with that conclusion, but ....)

As for the Board, folks are, of course, free to make any argument they like. I make it a point not to tell folks what to do or give legal advice. Personally, I don't think the Board will buy it for the same reasons that I don't think the courts will buy it. Indeed, any such ruling by the Board would invite Frosh to appeal the decision and that invites a bad result in the MD courts. The Board surely knows that. I am careful of the arguments I present for that reason alone as I know I may have to defend any win in the courts. I may be before the Board soon (my permit renewal restrictions are still in informal review before the MSP) but I won't run the argument for these reasons.

I have argued to the MSP and will argue to the Board (if I go there) that the RPAAD should be assessed by reference to the "palpable need" language of the 4th Circuit's decision in Woollard. See Woollard 793 F.3d at 880 ("the good and-substantial-reason requirement ensures that those persons in palpable need of self-protection can arm themselves in public places where Maryland's various permit exceptions do not apply"). That standard is also pretty vague but it is arguably less restrictive than the MSP's prior approach and it at least purports to take into account the 2A and thus provides a reasoned basis for departing from the prior, unduly restrictive approach followed by the MSP and the Board. It is no panacea, but until we get a SCT decision that overrules or abrogates Woollard, etc., that may be the best we can do with respect to the permitting process under 5-306.

Jaybeez · Sep 14, 2015

and rpaad being created to give relief under a total ban to people that travel to dangerous localities, should not still include travel to dangerous localities?

esqappellate · Sep 14, 2015

Jaybeez said:
and rpaad being created to give relief under a total ban to people that travel to dangerous localities, should not still include travel to dangerous localities?

If you are asking if applicants should list that sort of consistent travel, absolutely they should (IMHO) -- that is what Crawford and Woollard contemplate -- getting a permit a head of time where needed. I think that sort of travel may satisfy the "palpable need" test (at least if you have a necessity to engage in that sort of travel a lot for some business or other reason), but I very much doubt it would satisfy the existing approach followed by the MSP in its SOP dated 9/1/15, (attached) which provides, in part:

APPREHENDED DANGER/FEAR: an objectively established concern that the applicant’s life is in danger or that he/she is being targeted by individuals wishing to do him or her harm.

4. Personal protection - Personal protection requires:
a. Tangible evidence or evidence that may be documented and affirmed that the applicant’s life is in imminent danger and/or
b. Tangible evidence or evidence that may be documented or affirmed that the applicant is currently being targeted by individuals wishing to do the applicant harm."

That is why I am pushing "palpable need." One does have to ask oneself what the restriction language would look like, as that rationale would not support an unrestricted permit, unless (perhaps) you go to dangerous locales every day. If you travel to dangerous locales on a lark, then it is fair to ask *Why On Earth Would You Do That*

Jaybeez · Sep 14, 2015

I have the link to the sop in post #2 of this thread, along with some excerpts. I can think of no other more dangerous locality in the country today than Baltimore City, certainly its the most dangerous locality in the state. I may only travel there on a lark, but those that live there travel there daily.

of course locality can refer to a situation too, but "travel to" seems to infer a place or location.

redeemed.man · Sep 14, 2015

Jaybeez said:
I have the link to the sop in post #2 of this thread, along with some excerpts. I can think of no other more dangerous locality in the country today than Baltimore City, certainly its the most dangerous locality in the state. I may only travel there on a lark, but those that live there travel there daily.

of course locality can refer to a situation too, but "travel to" seems to infer a place or location.

I am there (in Baltimore City) three to four days a week for work. It reminds me of when I was a Corrections Officer except that all of the inmates are on the streets instead of behind bars.

esqappellate · Sep 15, 2015

boundlessdyad said:
I am there (in Baltimore City) three to four days a week for work. It reminds me of when I was a Corrections Officer except that all of the inmates are on the streets instead of behind bars.

Sad, isn't it. The was an article in the WSJ yesterday about the breakdown in respect for police and the consequences. The people hurt the worse are the people Who live there

redeemed.man · Sep 15, 2015

esqappellate said:
Sad, isn't it. The was an article in the WSJ yesterday about the breakdown in respect for police and the consequences. The people hurt the worse are the people Who live there

I know many fine folks (clients) who live in the city, mostly senior citizens. Sadly the younger generations in Baltimore City don't appear ready, willing, or able to step up to being fine upstanding citizens. They'd rather kill each other, do drugs, and live off the government (taxpayers). There doesn't appear to be much hope for a real change. I say this as I listen to this fraud of a pastor Jamal Bryant on WBAL talk about his run for congress.

Jaybeez · Sep 15, 2015

HPRB policy and procedure pdf:
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/agencies/HPRBpoicyiesandprocedures.pdf

excerpts:

POLICIES & PROCEDURES OF THE HANDGUN PERMIT REVIEW BOARD The Review Board’s policies are established by Maryland statute, as interpreted by Maryland court decisions. The Board, comprised of five private citizens appointed by the Governor, is vested with authority to hear appeals and -- when appropriate -- to overrule the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police (the MSP) in instances where a permit to carry a handgun is denied or limited by the Superintendent. A quorum (3 members) is required to be present to hold a hearing. A majority of voting members present is required to take action on the decision of the MSP. Board Procedures Testimony is taken under oath, and the MSP bears the burden of proof. In each case, a representative of the MSP is called to testify to a) the type of permit applied for, b) the results of the MSP investigation, and c) the conclusions and ruling by the Superintendent. The applicant is permitted to question that witness with respect to the MSP findings of fact, and members of the Board may likewise ask questions.

what do you think about the burden of proof being on MSP?

esqappellate · Sep 15, 2015

Jaybeez said:
HPRB policy and procedure pdf:
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/agencies/HPRBpoicyiesandprocedures.pdf

excerpts:

POLICIES & PROCEDURES OF THE HANDGUN PERMIT REVIEW BOARD The Review Board’s policies are established by Maryland statute, as interpreted by Maryland court decisions. The Board, comprised of five private citizens appointed by the Governor, is vested with authority to hear appeals and -- when appropriate -- to overrule the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police (the MSP) in instances where a permit to carry a handgun is denied or limited by the Superintendent. A quorum (3 members) is required to be present to hold a hearing. A majority of voting members present is required to take action on the decision of the MSP. Board Procedures Testimony is taken under oath, and the MSP bears the burden of proof. In each case, a representative of the MSP is called to testify to a) the type of permit applied for, b) the results of the MSP investigation, and c) the conclusions and ruling by the Superintendent. The applicant is permitted to question that witness with respect to the MSP findings of fact, and members of the Board may likewise ask questions.

what do you think about the burden of proof being on MSP?

I am not sure I quite understand what they are saying. "Proof" of *what* exactly?! Are they saying that the MSP has the burden to justify their actions? That's quite unusual in administrative law, where the burden is on the plaintiff to show that administrative agency action was arbitrary or contrary to law. As a concept, "burden of proof" is very important, as it allows the decision maker (here the Board) rule simply on a failure to carry the burden. I wonder how the Board itself is using this burden of proof allocation in its decisionmaking. Does it even come up during the hearings?

Brooklyn · Sep 15, 2015

Jaybeez said:
HPRB policy and procedure pdf:
https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/agencies/HPRBpoicyiesandprocedures.pdf

excerpts:

POLICIES & PROCEDURES OF THE HANDGUN PERMIT REVIEW BOARD The Review Board’s policies are established by Maryland statute, as interpreted by Maryland court decisions. The Board, comprised of five private citizens appointed by the Governor, is vested with authority to hear appeals and -- when appropriate -- to overrule the Superintendent of the Maryland State Police (the MSP) in instances where a permit to carry a handgun is denied or limited by the Superintendent. A quorum (3 members) is required to be present to hold a hearing. A majority of voting members present is required to take action on the decision of the MSP. Board Procedures Testimony is taken under oath, and the MSP bears the burden of proof. In each case, a representative of the MSP is called to testify to a) the type of permit applied for, b) the results of the MSP investigation, and c) the conclusions and ruling by the Superintendent. The applicant is permitted to question that witness with respect to the MSP findings of fact, and members of the Board may likewise ask questions.

what do you think about the burden of proof being on MSP?

Well the standard if proof.. is because we say so.

So not much help IMHO.

history: "Reasonable precaution against apprehended danger"

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