INMY01TA
Ultimate Member
- Dec 29, 2008
- 5,829
Beautiful!
VICTORY IN PALMER!!!!
- Thread starter teratos
- Start date
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Anyone know the background of the judge ... whether he would be more inclined to take our (Constitutionally correct) viewpoint on this matter, or he was swayed by Gura's argument, especially given the time it took for the ruling?
Future progress will be to show that G&S type standards where self-defense rights of citizens are considered unequally are de facto bans.
Future progress will be to show that G&S type standards where self-defense rights of citizens are considered unequally are de facto bans.
CypherPunk
Opinions Are My Own
- Apr 6, 2012
- 3,907
I wish we could have volunteers in every DC police district tomorrow, handing out flyers to officers as they arrive for roll call.
They might say:
Don't worry.
Every state that goes shall issue not only sees a drop in violent crime, but an increase in commerce and revenue.
The Second Amendment is an inalienable right that you are sworn to protect.
Even though you have invested a lot of time and training in the use of firearms, many citizens have as well.
Self defense is a civil right.
Violent criminals don't follow laws and concealed carry advocates support your locking them up and keeping them locked up.
LEOs need CCW permits too when they get neutered or retire.
It's a tough job. We appreciate your hard work.
They might say:
Don't worry.
Every state that goes shall issue not only sees a drop in violent crime, but an increase in commerce and revenue.
The Second Amendment is an inalienable right that you are sworn to protect.
Even though you have invested a lot of time and training in the use of firearms, many citizens have as well.
Self defense is a civil right.
Violent criminals don't follow laws and concealed carry advocates support your locking them up and keeping them locked up.
LEOs need CCW permits too when they get neutered or retire.
It's a tough job. We appreciate your hard work.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Scullin
Reagan Appointee with Viet Nam experience.
Reagan Appointee with Viet Nam experience.
lsw
לא לדרוך עליי
- Sep 2, 2013
- 1,975
Got home at 1 am today, thought I'd take a look at the forum, and wow, this thread is at the top of the new post list! What a great thing to see! A "Thank you SAF, Alan Gura, and Judge Scullin" T shirt would be a nice thing...
K.C.Dean
Ultimate Member
Christmas in July. I tought it was just a myth.
CypherPunk
Opinions Are My Own
- Apr 6, 2012
- 3,907
Some interesting comments on this over at http://forum.opencarry.org/forums/s...s-DC-ban-on-gun-carry-rights-unconstitutional
Does this impact their don't bring an empty shell casing into DC law?
You're assuming the police don't just shoot you for being a threat. And you can sue them all you like, after you've been arrested, put in handcuffs, taken to jail, spent as much as a few days in jail, gone before a judge, spent months awaiting trial, going to trial, and hoping you don't catch the most gun-hating liberal judge in the world who will find any possible way to send you to prison.
After all that, you can sue them for millions of dollars and possibly even win a few thousand out of the whole thing. Or more likely see your case dismissed without comment or reasoning. Either way, probably best to wait on this until it's gone through the entire judicial process. Expect another 5 years of waiting.
I'm a DC resident and never thought I'd live to see this!
If I remember correctly, many antis were opposed to DC taking Heller to SCOTUS because of the potential national impact if (when) they lost. I wonder if this same type of thinking will be applied for Palmer. In other words, will DC be pressured to let this stand and not appeal?
What a great weekend, my CMP Garand showed up on Thursday, now this! I'm buying a lottery ticket!
If I remember correctly, many antis were opposed to DC taking Heller to SCOTUS because of the potential national impact if (when) they lost. I wonder if this same type of thinking will be applied for Palmer. In other words, will DC be pressured to let this stand and not appeal?
What a great weekend, my CMP Garand showed up on Thursday, now this! I'm buying a lottery ticket!
I get the feeling (however misplaced it might be) that the NRA doesn't like Mr. Gura and SAF stealing their thunder. If they had been the lead plaintiff, this would likely be all over their site.
I could be totally wrong in this feeling however.
Mr H
Banana'd
Well slap my flanks and call me Flossie.....
Nice thing to see first thing in the morning!!!
Mr H
Banana'd
Without reading the full decision yet, it sure looked that way.
CrazySanMan
2013'er
I woke up in Finland this morning and thought I was still dreaming when I was reading about this ruling on Facebook. This is awesome news indeed, especially that self defense was specifically worded in the judgement. There is hope yet for Maryland!
I think the Judge's wording would preclude DC from trying a may issue scheme but
IANAL
IANAL
redeemed.man
Ultimate Member
Now out of the depths of HELL comes Owe'Drama with a new executive order declaring every square inch of DC a "sensitive place". You heard it here first 
I may just have to visit DC though before he uses his famous "pen" that he knows how to use oh so well to bypass Congress.
I may just have to visit DC though before he uses his famous "pen" that he knows how to use oh so well to bypass Congress.
Mr H
Banana'd
- Nov 14, 2010
- 20,274
- Nov 14, 2010
- 20,274
Something to keep in mind when Chrispie, I mean Christie flouts himself as a POTUS hopeful.
On_Target
Active Member
- Feb 7, 2013
- 222
Memorandum-Decision and Order Part 1
.
Page 19/19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA______________________________________________
TOM G. PALMER, GEORGE LYON,EDWARD RAYMOND, AMY MCVEY,and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:09-CV-1482(FJS)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA andCATHY LANIER,
Defendants.______________________________________________
APPEARANCES
OF COUNSEL
GURA & POSSESSKY, PLLC101 North Columbus Street, Suite 405Alexandria, Virginia 22314Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ALAN GURA, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEYGENERAL FOR THE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA441 Fourth Street, N.W.6th Floor SouthWashington, D.C. 20001Attorneys for Defendants
ANDREW J. SAINDON, ESQ.
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment.
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 1 of 19
II. BACKGROUND
In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert two claims for relief. In their first claim, Plaintiffs
allege that, "y requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public, yet refusing to issue such
permits and refusing to allow the possession of any handgun that would be carried in public,
Defendants maintain a complete ban on the carrying of handguns in public by almost all
individuals." See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 39. Plaintiffs also contend that "Defendants' laws,
customs, practices and policies generally banning the carrying of handguns in public violate the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against the
individual plaintiffs in this action, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See id.
at ¶ 40.
In their second claim for relief, Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants' laws, customs, practices
and policies generally refusing the registration of firearms by individuals who live outside the
District of Columbia violate the rights to travel and equal protection secured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against
the individual plaintiffs in this action, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See
id. at ¶ 42.
Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of an Order permanently enjoining Defendants, "their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the injunction, from enforcing D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) to ban
registration of handguns to be carried for self-defense by law-abiding citizens[.]" See id. at
WHEREFORE Clause. Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek an Order permanently enjoining
Defendants, "their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or
-2-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 2 of 19
participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, from enforcing D.C. Code
§ 22-4504(a), OR, in the alternative, ordering [D]efendants to issue licenses to carry handguns to
all individuals who desire such licenses and who have satisfied the existing requirements, aside
from residence requirements, for the registration of a handgun[.]" See id. Finally, Plaintiffs seek
an Order permanently enjoining Defendants, "their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction,
from denying firearm registration and handgun carry permit applications made by otherwise
qualified individuals on account of lack of residence within the District of Columbia[.]" See id.1
The parties do not dispute the basic facts that underlie this action. D.C. Code § 7-
2502.01(a) provides that "no persons or organization in the District shall possess or control any
firearm, unless the persons or organization holds a valid registration certificate for the firearm."
D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) provides that individuals who are not retired police officers may
only register a handgun "for use in self-defense within that person's home." Pursuant to this
statutory limitation, Defendants distribute handgun registration application forms requiring
applicants to "give a brief statement of your intended use of the firearm and where the firearm
will be kept."
Defendants maintain a custom, practice and policy of refusing to entertain gun
registration applications by individuals who do not reside in the District of Columbia.
Defendants require gun registration applicants to submit "[p]roof of residency in the District of
Columbia (e.g., a valid DC operator's permit, DC vehicle registration card, lease agreement for a
Plaintiffs also seek costs of the suit, including attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1§ 1988 and declaratory relief consistent with the injunction. See Complaint at WHEREFOREClause
-3-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 3 of 19
residence in the District, the deed to your home or other legal document showing DC residency."
A first violation of the District of Columbia's ban on the ownership or possession of unregistered
handguns is punishable as a misdemeanor by a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment of up to five
years, or both. See D. C. Code § 7-2507.06.
D.C. Code § 22-4504(a) provides that "[n]o person shall carry within the District of
Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued
pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so
concealed." The first violation of this section by a non-felon is punishable by a fine up to $5,000
and imprisonment of up to five years.
Former D.C. Code § 22-4506 empowered the District of Columbia's police chief to issue
licenses to carry handguns to individuals, including to individuals not residing in the District of
Columbia. However, it was Defendant District of Columbia's policy for many years not to issue
such licenses. On December 16, 2008, the District of Columbia's City Council and Mayor
repealed the Police Chief's authority to issue handgun carry licenses. Accordingly, the District of
Columbia lacks any mechanism to issue handgun carry licenses to individuals.
Plaintiff Palmer, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in public for
self-defense but refrains from doing so because he fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as he does not possess a license to carry a handgun. Plaintiff Palmer sought to
register a handgun in the District of Columbia so that he might carry it for self-defense. On or
about May 12, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied Plaintiff Palmer's application to register a handgun
for the following reason:
The intended use of the firearm as stated on your firearms
-4-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 4 of 19
registration application, "I intend to carry this firearm, loaded, inpublic, for self-defense, when not kept in my home" isunacceptable per the "Firearms Registration EmergencyAmendment Act of 2008," which states that pistols may only beregistered by D.C. residents for protection within the home.
Defendant Lanier subsequently approved Plaintiff Palmer's application to register the handgun
for home self-defense.
Plaintiff George Lyon, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in
public for self-defense but refrains from doing so because he fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as he does not possess a license to carry a handgun in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff
Lyon is licensed to carry handguns in the states of Virginia, Utah, and Florida. He has
approximately 240 hours of firearms training, of which approximately 140 hours relate
specifically to handguns. Plaintiff Lyon sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia
so that he might carry it for self-defense. On or about April 8, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied
Plaintiff Lyon's application to register a handgun for the following reason:
The intended storage and use of the firearm as stated on yourfirearms registration application, "carrying personal protection,keep at home or office" is unacceptable per the "FirearmsRegistration Emergency Amendment Act of 2008," which statesthat pistols may only be registered by D.C. residents for protectionwithin the home.
Defendant Lanier subsequently approved Plaintiff Lyon's application to register the handgun for
home self-defense.
At the time Plaintiffs filed this action, Plaintiff Raymond was not a resident of the
District, was enrolled as a student in the Franklin Pierce Law Center in New Hampshire, was
employed as a Patent Examiner and owned a home in Waldorf, Maryland. Plaintiff Raymond
-5-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 5 of 19
holds a Master of Business Administration degree as well as a Master of Science degree in
Electrical Engineering. He has started various successful businesses and is an honorably
discharged Navy veteran.
On April 6, 2007, District of Columbia Police stopped Plaintiff Raymond for allegedly
speeding. At that time, Plaintiff Raymond held valid permits to carry a handgun issued by the
states of Maryland and Florida and still holds those permits. Although Plaintiff Raymond was
never charged with a traffic violation, he was charged with carrying a pistol without a license
because his loaded handgun was located in his car's center console. Plaintiff Raymond
subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of an unregistered firearm and unregistered
ammunition. He successfully completed a sentence of probation.
Plaintiff Raymond would carry a functional handgun in public for self-defense while
visiting and traveling through the District of Columbia but refrains from doing so because he
fears another arrest and prosecution as well as fine and imprisonment as he does not possess a
license to carry a handgun in the District of Columbia. On June 26, 2009, Plaintiff Raymond
sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia, but he was refused an application form
because of his lack of residence in the District.
Plaintiff Amy McVey, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in
public for self-defense but refrains from doing so because she fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as she does not possess a license to carry a handgun in the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff McVey is licensed by the state of Virginia to publicly carry a handgun.
Plaintiff McVey sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia so that she could
carry it for self-defense. On July 7, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied her application to register a
-6-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 6 of 19
handgun for the following reason:
The intended storage and use of the firearm as stated on yourfirearms registration application, "I intend to carry the loadedfirearm in public for self-defense when not stored in my home" isunacceptable per the "Firearms Registration EmergencyAmendment Act of 2008," which states that pistols may only beregistered by D.C. residents for protection within the home.
Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. ("SAF") is a non-profit membership
organization incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in
Bellevue, Washington. SAF has more than 650,000 members and supporters nationwide,
including in the District of Columbia. The purposes of SAF include education, research,
publishing and legal action focusing on the Constitutional right to privately own and possess
firearms and the consequences of gun control. SAF expends its resources encouraging the
exercise of the right to bear arms and advising and educating its members, supporters, and the
general public about the law with respect to carrying handguns in the District of Columbia. The
issues raised by, and consequences of, Defendants' policies are of great interest to SAF's
constituency. Defendants' policies regularly cause SAF to expend resources as people turn to it
for advice and information. Defendants' policies bar the members and supporters of SAF from
obtaining permits to carry handguns.
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), direct the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs'
claims. In Heller, the plaintiffs mounted a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
-7-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 7 of 19
Columbia law that "totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home" and "require[d] that any
lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock[.]" Heller, 554 U.S. at
603, 628. The validity of the challenged measures depended, as a preliminary matter, on whether
the Second Amendment codified an individual right or a collective right. See id. at 577. After
consulting the text's original public meaning, the Court concluded that the Second Amendment
codified a pre-existing, individual right to keep and bear arms and that the "central component of
the right" was self-defense. See id. at 592, 599. Furthermore, the Court held that, because "the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home," the D.C. ban on the
home use of handguns "the most preferred firearm in the nation" failed "constitutional
muster" under any standard of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 628-29 & n.27. The same was true for
the trigger-lock requirement. See id. at 635. The Heller Court concluded that it did not need to
"undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment" to
dispose of the case. Id. at 626. Nor did the Court have a reason to specify, for future cases,
which burdens on the Second Amendment right triggered which standards of review, or whether
a tiered-scrutiny approach was even appropriate in the first place. See id. at 628-29. By any
measure, the Court found that the District of Columbia statute overreached.
Two years later, in McDonald, the Court evaluated a similar handgun ban that the City of
Chicago had enacted. The question presented in McDonald, however, was not whether the ban
infringed the Chicago's residents' Second Amendment rights, but, rather, whether a state
government could even be subject to the strictures of the Second Amendment. The answer to
that question depended on whether the right was "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition'" and "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty[.]" McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
-8-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 8 of 19
The Court stated that its "decision in Heller point[ed] unmistakably to the answer." Id. The
Court explained that self-defense, recognized since ancient times as a "basic right," was the
"central component" of the Second Amendment guarantee. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that
that right restricted not only the federal government but, under the Fourteenth Amendment, also
the states. See id. at 3026. Having reached that conclusion, the Court remanded the case to the
Seventh Circuit for an analysis of whether, in light of Heller, the Chicago handgun ban infringed
the Second Amendment right. See id. at 3050.
Neither Heller nor McDonald speaks explicitly or precisely to the scope of the Second
Amendment right outside the home or to what it takes to "infringe" that right. However, both
opinions, at the very least, "point[] in a general direction." Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 700 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that Heller does not leave the court "without a framework for
how to proceed"). As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. 2014), which addressed statutes very similar to the ones at issue in this case, 2
[t]o resolve the challenge to the D.C. restrictions, the Hellermajority described and applied a certain methodology: it addressed,first, whether having operable handguns in the home amounted to"keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms" within the meaning of the SecondAmendment and, next, whether the challenged laws, if they indeed
The Peruta court addressed the issue of "whether a responsible, law-abiding citizen has2a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm in public for self-defense." Peruta, 742F.3d at 1147. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that "California generally prohibits theopen or concealed carriage of a handgun, whether loaded or unloaded, in public locations." Id.(citations and footnote omitted). However, an individual could apply for a license to carry aconcealed weapon in the city or county in which he worked or resided. See id. at 1148 (citationsomitted). To obtain such a license, however, an applicant had to meet several requirements,including a demonstration of good moral character, completion of a specified training course, andestablishing good cause. See id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff challenged San Diego County'sprocedures for obtaining a concealed-carry license, in particular its definition of the term "goodcause." See id.
-9-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 9 of 19
did burden constitutionally protected conduct, "infringed" the right.
Id. at 1150.3
In analyzing the issues in this case, the Court must apply the two-step approach that the
District of Columbia Circuit set forth in Heller v. Dist. of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244
(D.C. Cir. 2011). The first question requires this Court to decide whether the restricted activity,
in this case, a restriction on a responsible, law-abiding citizen's ability to carry a gun outside the
home for self-defense falls within the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the
purpose of self defense. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (citing Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701; Kachalsky
v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2012)). To determine the precise methods by
which that right's scope is discerned, the Supreme Court has directed, in both Heller and
McDonald, that courts must consult "both text and history." Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3047).
As the Court noted in Heller, "Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. To arrive at the
original understanding of the right, "we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning'" unless evidence suggests that the language
As the Peruta court noted, several other circuit courts have also applied this two-step3inquiry. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9thCir. 2013); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012);Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701-04; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); UnitedStates v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
-10-
.
Page 19/19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA______________________________________________
TOM G. PALMER, GEORGE LYON,EDWARD RAYMOND, AMY MCVEY,and SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:09-CV-1482(FJS)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA andCATHY LANIER,
Defendants.______________________________________________
APPEARANCES
OF COUNSEL
GURA & POSSESSKY, PLLC101 North Columbus Street, Suite 405Alexandria, Virginia 22314Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ALAN GURA, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEYGENERAL FOR THE DISTRICTOF COLUMBIA441 Fourth Street, N.W.6th Floor SouthWashington, D.C. 20001Attorneys for Defendants
ANDREW J. SAINDON, ESQ.
SCULLIN, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment.
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 1 of 19
II. BACKGROUND
In their complaint, Plaintiffs assert two claims for relief. In their first claim, Plaintiffs
allege that, "y requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public, yet refusing to issue such
permits and refusing to allow the possession of any handgun that would be carried in public,
Defendants maintain a complete ban on the carrying of handguns in public by almost all
individuals." See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint at ¶ 39. Plaintiffs also contend that "Defendants' laws,
customs, practices and policies generally banning the carrying of handguns in public violate the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against the
individual plaintiffs in this action, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See id.
at ¶ 40.
In their second claim for relief, Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants' laws, customs, practices
and policies generally refusing the registration of firearms by individuals who live outside the
District of Columbia violate the rights to travel and equal protection secured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, facially and as applied against
the individual plaintiffs in this action, damaging plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." See
id. at ¶ 42.
Plaintiffs seek relief in the form of an Order permanently enjoining Defendants, "their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the injunction, from enforcing D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) to ban
registration of handguns to be carried for self-defense by law-abiding citizens[.]" See id. at
WHEREFORE Clause. Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek an Order permanently enjoining
Defendants, "their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or
-2-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 2 of 19
participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction, from enforcing D.C. Code
§ 22-4504(a), OR, in the alternative, ordering [D]efendants to issue licenses to carry handguns to
all individuals who desire such licenses and who have satisfied the existing requirements, aside
from residence requirements, for the registration of a handgun[.]" See id. Finally, Plaintiffs seek
an Order permanently enjoining Defendants, "their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction,
from denying firearm registration and handgun carry permit applications made by otherwise
qualified individuals on account of lack of residence within the District of Columbia[.]" See id.1
The parties do not dispute the basic facts that underlie this action. D.C. Code § 7-
2502.01(a) provides that "no persons or organization in the District shall possess or control any
firearm, unless the persons or organization holds a valid registration certificate for the firearm."
D.C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) provides that individuals who are not retired police officers may
only register a handgun "for use in self-defense within that person's home." Pursuant to this
statutory limitation, Defendants distribute handgun registration application forms requiring
applicants to "give a brief statement of your intended use of the firearm and where the firearm
will be kept."
Defendants maintain a custom, practice and policy of refusing to entertain gun
registration applications by individuals who do not reside in the District of Columbia.
Defendants require gun registration applicants to submit "[p]roof of residency in the District of
Columbia (e.g., a valid DC operator's permit, DC vehicle registration card, lease agreement for a
Plaintiffs also seek costs of the suit, including attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1§ 1988 and declaratory relief consistent with the injunction. See Complaint at WHEREFOREClause
-3-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 3 of 19
residence in the District, the deed to your home or other legal document showing DC residency."
A first violation of the District of Columbia's ban on the ownership or possession of unregistered
handguns is punishable as a misdemeanor by a fine of up to $1,000, imprisonment of up to five
years, or both. See D. C. Code § 7-2507.06.
D.C. Code § 22-4504(a) provides that "[n]o person shall carry within the District of
Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued
pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so
concealed." The first violation of this section by a non-felon is punishable by a fine up to $5,000
and imprisonment of up to five years.
Former D.C. Code § 22-4506 empowered the District of Columbia's police chief to issue
licenses to carry handguns to individuals, including to individuals not residing in the District of
Columbia. However, it was Defendant District of Columbia's policy for many years not to issue
such licenses. On December 16, 2008, the District of Columbia's City Council and Mayor
repealed the Police Chief's authority to issue handgun carry licenses. Accordingly, the District of
Columbia lacks any mechanism to issue handgun carry licenses to individuals.
Plaintiff Palmer, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in public for
self-defense but refrains from doing so because he fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as he does not possess a license to carry a handgun. Plaintiff Palmer sought to
register a handgun in the District of Columbia so that he might carry it for self-defense. On or
about May 12, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied Plaintiff Palmer's application to register a handgun
for the following reason:
The intended use of the firearm as stated on your firearms
-4-
Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 51 Filed 07/26/14 Page 4 of 19
registration application, "I intend to carry this firearm, loaded, inpublic, for self-defense, when not kept in my home" isunacceptable per the "Firearms Registration EmergencyAmendment Act of 2008," which states that pistols may only beregistered by D.C. residents for protection within the home.
Defendant Lanier subsequently approved Plaintiff Palmer's application to register the handgun
for home self-defense.
Plaintiff George Lyon, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in
public for self-defense but refrains from doing so because he fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as he does not possess a license to carry a handgun in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff
Lyon is licensed to carry handguns in the states of Virginia, Utah, and Florida. He has
approximately 240 hours of firearms training, of which approximately 140 hours relate
specifically to handguns. Plaintiff Lyon sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia
so that he might carry it for self-defense. On or about April 8, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied
Plaintiff Lyon's application to register a handgun for the following reason:
The intended storage and use of the firearm as stated on yourfirearms registration application, "carrying personal protection,keep at home or office" is unacceptable per the "FirearmsRegistration Emergency Amendment Act of 2008," which statesthat pistols may only be registered by D.C. residents for protectionwithin the home.
Defendant Lanier subsequently approved Plaintiff Lyon's application to register the handgun for
home self-defense.
At the time Plaintiffs filed this action, Plaintiff Raymond was not a resident of the
District, was enrolled as a student in the Franklin Pierce Law Center in New Hampshire, was
employed as a Patent Examiner and owned a home in Waldorf, Maryland. Plaintiff Raymond
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holds a Master of Business Administration degree as well as a Master of Science degree in
Electrical Engineering. He has started various successful businesses and is an honorably
discharged Navy veteran.
On April 6, 2007, District of Columbia Police stopped Plaintiff Raymond for allegedly
speeding. At that time, Plaintiff Raymond held valid permits to carry a handgun issued by the
states of Maryland and Florida and still holds those permits. Although Plaintiff Raymond was
never charged with a traffic violation, he was charged with carrying a pistol without a license
because his loaded handgun was located in his car's center console. Plaintiff Raymond
subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of an unregistered firearm and unregistered
ammunition. He successfully completed a sentence of probation.
Plaintiff Raymond would carry a functional handgun in public for self-defense while
visiting and traveling through the District of Columbia but refrains from doing so because he
fears another arrest and prosecution as well as fine and imprisonment as he does not possess a
license to carry a handgun in the District of Columbia. On June 26, 2009, Plaintiff Raymond
sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia, but he was refused an application form
because of his lack of residence in the District.
Plaintiff Amy McVey, a resident of the District, would carry a functional handgun in
public for self-defense but refrains from doing so because she fears arrest, prosecution, fine, and
imprisonment as she does not possess a license to carry a handgun in the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff McVey is licensed by the state of Virginia to publicly carry a handgun.
Plaintiff McVey sought to register a handgun in the District of Columbia so that she could
carry it for self-defense. On July 7, 2009, Defendant Lanier denied her application to register a
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handgun for the following reason:
The intended storage and use of the firearm as stated on yourfirearms registration application, "I intend to carry the loadedfirearm in public for self-defense when not stored in my home" isunacceptable per the "Firearms Registration EmergencyAmendment Act of 2008," which states that pistols may only beregistered by D.C. residents for protection within the home.
Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. ("SAF") is a non-profit membership
organization incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in
Bellevue, Washington. SAF has more than 650,000 members and supporters nationwide,
including in the District of Columbia. The purposes of SAF include education, research,
publishing and legal action focusing on the Constitutional right to privately own and possess
firearms and the consequences of gun control. SAF expends its resources encouraging the
exercise of the right to bear arms and advising and educating its members, supporters, and the
general public about the law with respect to carrying handguns in the District of Columbia. The
issues raised by, and consequences of, Defendants' policies are of great interest to SAF's
constituency. Defendants' policies regularly cause SAF to expend resources as people turn to it
for advice and information. Defendants' policies bar the members and supporters of SAF from
obtaining permits to carry handguns.
III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), direct the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs'
claims. In Heller, the plaintiffs mounted a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
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Columbia law that "totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home" and "require[d] that any
lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock[.]" Heller, 554 U.S. at
603, 628. The validity of the challenged measures depended, as a preliminary matter, on whether
the Second Amendment codified an individual right or a collective right. See id. at 577. After
consulting the text's original public meaning, the Court concluded that the Second Amendment
codified a pre-existing, individual right to keep and bear arms and that the "central component of
the right" was self-defense. See id. at 592, 599. Furthermore, the Court held that, because "the
need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home," the D.C. ban on the
home use of handguns "the most preferred firearm in the nation" failed "constitutional
muster" under any standard of heightened scrutiny. Id. at 628-29 & n.27. The same was true for
the trigger-lock requirement. See id. at 635. The Heller Court concluded that it did not need to
"undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment" to
dispose of the case. Id. at 626. Nor did the Court have a reason to specify, for future cases,
which burdens on the Second Amendment right triggered which standards of review, or whether
a tiered-scrutiny approach was even appropriate in the first place. See id. at 628-29. By any
measure, the Court found that the District of Columbia statute overreached.
Two years later, in McDonald, the Court evaluated a similar handgun ban that the City of
Chicago had enacted. The question presented in McDonald, however, was not whether the ban
infringed the Chicago's residents' Second Amendment rights, but, rather, whether a state
government could even be subject to the strictures of the Second Amendment. The answer to
that question depended on whether the right was "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition'" and "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty[.]" McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
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The Court stated that its "decision in Heller point[ed] unmistakably to the answer." Id. The
Court explained that self-defense, recognized since ancient times as a "basic right," was the
"central component" of the Second Amendment guarantee. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that
that right restricted not only the federal government but, under the Fourteenth Amendment, also
the states. See id. at 3026. Having reached that conclusion, the Court remanded the case to the
Seventh Circuit for an analysis of whether, in light of Heller, the Chicago handgun ban infringed
the Second Amendment right. See id. at 3050.
Neither Heller nor McDonald speaks explicitly or precisely to the scope of the Second
Amendment right outside the home or to what it takes to "infringe" that right. However, both
opinions, at the very least, "point[] in a general direction." Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d
684, 700 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that Heller does not leave the court "without a framework for
how to proceed"). As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. 2014), which addressed statutes very similar to the ones at issue in this case, 2
[t]o resolve the challenge to the D.C. restrictions, the Hellermajority described and applied a certain methodology: it addressed,first, whether having operable handguns in the home amounted to"keep[ing] and bear[ing] Arms" within the meaning of the SecondAmendment and, next, whether the challenged laws, if they indeed
The Peruta court addressed the issue of "whether a responsible, law-abiding citizen has2a right under the Second Amendment to carry a firearm in public for self-defense." Peruta, 742F.3d at 1147. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that "California generally prohibits theopen or concealed carriage of a handgun, whether loaded or unloaded, in public locations." Id.(citations and footnote omitted). However, an individual could apply for a license to carry aconcealed weapon in the city or county in which he worked or resided. See id. at 1148 (citationsomitted). To obtain such a license, however, an applicant had to meet several requirements,including a demonstration of good moral character, completion of a specified training course, andestablishing good cause. See id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff challenged San Diego County'sprocedures for obtaining a concealed-carry license, in particular its definition of the term "goodcause." See id.
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did burden constitutionally protected conduct, "infringed" the right.
Id. at 1150.3
In analyzing the issues in this case, the Court must apply the two-step approach that the
District of Columbia Circuit set forth in Heller v. Dist. of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244
(D.C. Cir. 2011). The first question requires this Court to decide whether the restricted activity,
in this case, a restriction on a responsible, law-abiding citizen's ability to carry a gun outside the
home for self-defense falls within the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the
purpose of self defense. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (citing Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701; Kachalsky
v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 2012)). To determine the precise methods by
which that right's scope is discerned, the Supreme Court has directed, in both Heller and
McDonald, that courts must consult "both text and history." Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3047).
As the Court noted in Heller, "Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad." Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35. To arrive at the
original understanding of the right, "we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and
ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning'" unless evidence suggests that the language
As the Peruta court noted, several other circuit courts have also applied this two-step3inquiry. See Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9thCir. 2013); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012);Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701-04; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); UnitedStates v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
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