pcfixer
Ultimate Member
Heller: Held
[/U]Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts
and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265,
refutes the individual rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not
limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather
limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by
the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
AND:
1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments. . .”).
If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would
be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational basis.the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to
‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,” 478 F. 3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster.
[/U]Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts
and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553, nor
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 264–265,
refutes the individual rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not
limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather
limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by
the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be
banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said,
the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.
AND:
1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided by rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments. . .”).
If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would
be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational basis.the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to
‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,” 478 F. 3d, at 400, would fail constitutional muster.