krucam
Ultimate Member
I was just reminded that Peruta v San Diego arguments are also scheduled for 11/15/2010....
Fingers will definitely be crossed that day...
Fingers will definitely be crossed that day...
Second hand reporting but there were two interesting things that came out. At least one of the panel seemed skeptical of the historical pedigree of registration (a pleasant surprise.) Also, one of the panel seemed to take seriously the argument that DC gun laws violated their statutory authority delegated from Congress which means this case could be decided our way without impacting 2A jurisprudence.
Only time will tell.
Gene
11/15/2010 Open Document ORAL ARGUMENT HELD before Judges Ginsburg, Henderson and Kavanaugh. [10-7036]
11/16/2010 PER CURIAM ORDER filed [1277816] directing the parties to file supplemental briefs address four specific questions (see order for details of questions); The following format will apply: Supplemental brief for appellants (not to exceed 20 pages) due 12/01/2010; Supplemental brief for appellees (not to exceed 20 pages) due 12/08/2010; Reply brief for appellants (not to exceed 10 pages) due 12/13/2010. The United States is invited to file a brief, not to exceed 20 pages, on any or all of these questions by Friday, 12/03/2010. In addition to electronic filing, the parties are directed to deliver paper copies to the court on the date due. Before Judges: Ginsburg, Henderson and Kavanaugh. [10-7036]
(1) After the Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified at D.C. Code §§ 1-201.01–1-207.71 (2001)), do gun laws passed by the District of Columbia Council have to be “usual and reasonable” within the meaning of the federal Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-401, which is currently codified at D.C. Code § 1- 303.43? Cf. McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 749-54 (D.C. 1978); Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C. v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Maryland & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 125-29 & 125 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fulton v. District of Columbia, 2 App. D.C. 431, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1894).
(2) What does the term “usual” mean in this statute? Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Firemen’s Ins. Co., 483 F.2d at 1327-28; Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1969); Filippo v. Real Estate Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 223 A.2d 268 (D.C. 1966); Black’s Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1910) (defining usual to mean “ordinary” or “customary”). Is the canon of constitutional avoidance relevant to that question? Cf. Fulton, 2 App. D.C. at 438-39.
(3) Are the challenged D.C. laws “usual” within the meaning of this statute?
(4) Does the D.C. Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the congressionally enacted Act of June 30, 1906, or of similarly worded federal statutes, receive deference from the federal courts? Cf. Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1994). If so, under what circumstances?
The Council of the District of Columbia is hereby authorized and empowered to make, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia is hereby authorized and empowered to enforce, all such usual and reasonable police regulations, in addition to those already made under §§ 1-303.01 to 1-303.03 as the Council may deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, explosives, or weapons of any kind in the District of Columbia.
Page 202 said:...
In short, if I could be persuaded to read the Second Amendment dynamically to create a right independent of the militia context, I would end up with something very close to Justice Scalia’s limitations on that right. It is also worth noting that a dynamic approach to tradition also suggests a statutory solution to the problem addressed in Heller. A superior route to the Heller result, from a legal point of view, would be a statutory argument of the following sort: Congress has plenary authority over the District of Columbia. In a 1906 umbrella statute, Congress exercised that authority to allow the District to enact “all such usual and reasonable police regulations . . . as they may deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, explosives, or weapons of any kind in the District of Columbia.” In light of Congress’s 1932 Act and other statutes surveyed above, the District’s regulation of home use of firearms is neither “usual” nor “reasonable” under the 1906 statute. This would have resolved the case in a more rigorous legal way, would have protected the norm, and would have respected precedent as well as original meaning.
So he's suing because he can't register the gun he already has?
admittedly i didn't read the last 3-4 pages...
They may be avoiding a Constitutional Decision, instead relying on statuatory reasons for striking the unjust laws. There is a strange medium between Congress and the District of Columbia....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitutional_avoidance
Gray Peterson brought this up at Calguns. Interesting thought....
So he's suing because he can't register the gun he already has?
admittedly i didn't read the last 3-4 pages...
That was the thrust of my first thought, too.
But after thinking it over, it would be hard to completely duck the 2A question. For instance, how can you define "reasonable" regulation of guns under Congressional authority without some lines drawn as to what is and is not..."reasonable". So to answer the question "Are these regulation usual and reasonable?" you need to talk about guns to some extent.
Unless...they point out that Congress does not ban these things and therefore DC cannot ban them either. That's the only way they can avoid the Constitutional questions. But it requires they stick to the question of "usual", not "reasonable". And in that case, DC's laws are not "usual" in the nation or in the Congress, and they exceed the level of policing that is typically used. Therefore, Heller wins but the rest of wait for another case.
Again...this might be a DC-only trick.
Twisted this is.
Heller II is concerned with (From Volokh):
The ban on all self-loading handguns (about 3/4 of handguns sold in the U.S.) by defining them as "machine guns."
I hear you! And this 'Constitutional Avoidance' question was only posed by one person, albeit a VERY knowledgeable person IMO.
I would love this "kitchen sink" case to come out with Constitutional related jurisprudence vs Statutory...but again, a win is a win.
That trick cannot work in MD, though. Nor Palmer.
Dear Folks,
The HELLER II case was heard on Monday 11/15/10.
I am sending you 2 E-mails.
1.
The first is from my atty who argued for Heller II yesterday in the Appellate Court shows that the 1906 legislation perspective remains important today.
Info is on the www.HellerFoundation.org website.
The Site is still in update mode "as we speak"....
2.
The following amicus links relates to the 1906 Firearms law concepts that might be helpful in VA & MD.
pages 2-20 1906 laws - "Usual & Reasonable"
http://www.nraila.org/heller/proamicusbriefs/07-290_amicus_congress.pdf
pages 5-10
http://www.stephenhalbrook.com/law_review_articles/secondamendment.dc.pdf